Rethinking Targeted Killing Policy: Reducing Uncertainty, Protecting Civilians from the Ravages of both Terrorism and Counterterrorism by Krebs, Shiri
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 44
Issue 3 Spring 2017 Article 2
Spring 2017
Rethinking Targeted Killing Policy: Reducing
Uncertainty, Protecting Civilians from the Ravages
of both Terrorism and Counterterrorism
Shiri Krebs
Deakin University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the International Law Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shiri Krebs, Rethinking Targeted Killing Policy: Reducing Uncertainty, Protecting Civilians from the Ravages of both Terrorism and
Counterterrorism, 44 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 943 () .
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol44/iss3/2
 RETHINKING TARGETED KILLING POLICY: REDUCING 
UNCERTAINTY, PROTECTING CIVILIANS FROM THE 
RAVAGES OF BOTH TERRORISM AND 
COUNTERTERRORISM 
SHIRI KREBS* 
ABSTRACT 
 Targeted killing is a lethal and irreversible counterterrorism measure. Its use is gov-
erned by ambiguous legal norms and controlled by security-oriented decisionmaking pro-
cesses. Oversight is inherently limited, as most of the relevant information is top secret. Un-
der these circumstances, attempts to assess the legality of targeted killing operations raise 
challenging, yet often undecided, questions, including: How should the relevant legal norms 
be interpreted? How unequivocal and updated must the evidence be? And, given the inherent 
limitations of intelligence information, how should doubt and uncertainty be treated? 
 Based on risk analysis, organizational culture and biased cognition theories, as well as 
on recently released primary documents (including the U.S. Department of Justice Drone 
Memo and the Report of the Israeli Special Investigatory Commission on the targeted 
killing of Salah Shehadeh) and a comprehensive analysis of hundreds of conflicting legal 
sources (including judicial decisions, law review articles, and books), this Article offers new 
answers to some of these old and taunting questions.  
 It clearly defines legal terms such as “military necessity” and “feasible precaution;” it 
develops a clear-cut, activity-based test for determinations on direct participation in hostil-
ities; it designs an independent ex-post review mechanism for targeting decisions; and it 
calls for governmental transparency concerning kill-lists and targeting decisionmaking 
processes. Most importantly, it identifies uncertainty, in law and in practice, as an im-
portant challenge to any targeted killing regime. Based on analysis of interdisciplinary 
studies and lessons from the experience of both the United States and Israel, it advocates a 
transparent, straightforward, and unambiguous interpretation of targeted killing law—an 
interpretation that can reduce uncertainty and, if adopted, protect civilians from the ravag-
es of both terrorism and counterterrorism. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 On August 13, 2015, a U.S. airstrike outside Raqqa, Syria, target-
ed twenty-one-year-old Junaid Hussain—a hacker from Birmingham, 
England—who tapped into American military networks and was a 
central figure in the Islamic State militant group’s online recruit-
ment campaign. Months later, on January 29, 2016, U.S. Central 
Command admitted that instead of killing Hussain, the airstrike re-
sulted in the death of three civilians and that five more were in-
2017]  RETHINKING TARGETED KILLING  
 
945 
jured.1 Hussain was eventually killed in another U.S. airstrike that 
took place eleven days later.2  
 The U.S. Central Command press release specifically mentioned 
that this information is made public “as part of our commitment to 
transparency.”3 Nonetheless, the brief press release, which devoted 
only thirty-two words to an airstrike that killed three civilians and 
injured five, left most of the relevant information in the dark: What 
was the criteria according to which a hacker was added to a kill-list? 
How powerful and updated was the evidence against Hussain? What 
precautions were taken to prevent harming civilians? And lastly, who 
were the victims of the attack that were killed or injured simply be-
cause they happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time?  
 Central Command’s partial transparency concerning civilian cas-
ualties, together with other recently released documents, such as the 
U.S. Department of Justice White Paper on targeted killings of U.S. 
citizens, the U.S. Department of Justice Drone Memo on the targeted 
killing of Anwar Al-Aulaqi,4 and the report of the Israeli Special In-
vestigatory Commission on the targeted killing of Salach Shehadeh,5 
provide important information for the public debate on targeted kill-
ings. At the same time, the relatively small amount of information 
released underscores the thick veil of secrecy that still surrounds the 
                                                                                                                       
 1. Press Release, U.S. Cent. Command, U.S. Central Command Releases Results of 
Iraq and Syria Civilian Casualty Assessments (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Central Com-
mand Press Release], http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-
View/Article/904489/jan-29-us-central-command-releases-results-of-iraq-and-syria-civilian-
casualty/ [https://perma.cc/5UV2-5YT8]. 
 2. Iraq Progresses in ISIL Fight, Key Extremist Confirmed Dead, U.S. DEP’T DEF. 
(Aug. 15, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/615305/iraq-progresses-in-
isil-fight-key-extremist-confirmed-dead?source=GovDelivery [https://perma.cc/C89N-YJXY]; see 
also Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura, Junaid Hussain, ISIS Recruiter, Reported Killed in Air-
strike, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/world/middleeast/junaid-
hussain-islamic-state-recruiter-killed.html. 
 3. Central Command Press Release, supra note 1. 
 4. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN 
WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 1 (2013)  
[hereinafter DOJ WHITE PAPER], http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/ 
020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9CK-V83V]. The U.S. Justice Department’s 
Office of Legal Counsel memo that signed-off on the effort to target Anwar Al-Awlaki was 
released in June 2014 as a result of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuits brought 
by the New York Times and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). See Memorandum 
from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., on Applicability of Federal Criminal Laws 
and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi to 
U.S. Att’y Gen. 21 (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter The Drone Memo], https://www.aclu.org/files/ 
assets/2014-06-23_barron-memorandum.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCL4-WMU8].  
 5. Ido Rosenzweig & Yuval Shany, Special Investigatory Commission Publishes Report on 
Targeted Killing of Shehadeh, 27 ISR. DEMOCRATIC INS. TERRORISM & DEMOCRACY NEWSL. (2011).  
  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:943 
 
 
946 
discussions in this field.6 Moreover, it demonstrates some of the main 
weaknesses of targeted killings law and policy: the ambiguous nature 
of the relevant law, its security-oriented implementation, and the 
inadequacy of current oversight mechanisms.  
 In a recent article, Gregory McNeal presented a comprehensive 
description of the U.S. targeted killing process, arguing that many of 
the existing critiques of targeted killings rest upon poorly conceived 
understandings of the process. He promoted several minor reform 
recommendations to “enhance the already robust accountability 
mechanisms embedded in current practice.”7 However, McNeal’s ac-
count, which is based on official documents and interviews with 
anonymous U.S. decisionmakers, cannot and does not account for the 
systemic biases which are inherent to decisionmaking generally—
particularly concerning national security matters such as targeted 
killings.  
 Indeed, in another recent article, Ganesh Sitaraman and David 
Zionts identified the implications of errors, biases, and failures—
including the illusion of transparency—on war-powers decisionmak-
ing processes; and they concluded their article by calling lawyers, 
scholars, and decisionmakers to pay increasing attention to “behav-
ioral war powers.”8  
 This Article responds to that call. By focusing on targeted killing 
law and policy, it offers an interdisciplinary comparative analysis of a 
very sensitive, secretive, and lethal decisionmaking process. This de-
tailed analysis of targeted killing decisionmaking processes sheds 
light on yet another behavioral aspect of war powers decisionmaking 
that was not addressed by McNeal or by Sitaraman and Zionts: the 
treatment of doubt and uncertainty.  
 Uncertainty dominates almost every aspect of targeted killing law 
and policy: from the relevant body of law to be applied, to the inter-
pretation of specific norms, to the strength and breadth of evidence 
required, and to making factual determinations based on uncertain 
intelligence.  
                                                                                                                       
 6. In contrast to President Obama’s rhetoric promising transparency on the U.S. 
drone program, the Obama Administration has been fighting in courts requests made by 
the New York Times and the ACLU under FOIA to release information about the govern-
ment’s targeted killing program, including the Presidential Policy Guidance under which 
the program likely now operates, and details on who the government has killed and why. 
See, e.g., ACLU v. DOJ—FOIA Case Relating to Targeted Killing Law, Policy, and Casualties, 
ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/aclu-v-doj-foia-case-records-relating-targeted-killing-law-
policy-and-casualties [https://perma.cc/GW4L-UYDL] (last updated Aug. 3, 2017); see also 
Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 90 F. Supp. 3d 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Al-
Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D.D.C. 2014) (granting motion to dismiss). 
 7. Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. L.J. 681, 793 (2014).    
 8. Ganesh Sitaraman & David Zionts, Behavioral War Powers, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 516 (2015). 
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 To disperse this fog of uncertainty, the Article begins, in Parts II 
and III, with an overview of the current uncertainties and ambiguity 
in targeted killing law. Part IV complements the legal uncertainty 
with an interdisciplinary analysis of the uncertainty regarding vari-
ous aspects of implementing these laws. The studies surveyed in this 
Part include literature on organizational culture in the intelligence 
community, biased risk assessments, and misjudgments of facts. Part 
V then illustrates some of these unwarranted dynamics using the 
report of the Israeli Special Investigatory Commission on the target-
ed killing of Salah Shehadeh (Shehadeh Commission). Based on 
analysis of interdisciplinary studies and lessons from the experience 
of both the United States and Israel, Part VI designs a new model for 
interpreting and implementing targeting law—a model that can re-
duce uncertainty and, if adopted, protect civilians from the ravages of 
both terrorism and counterterrorism. 
II.   LEGAL UNCERTAINTY  
 The term “targeted killing” refers to intentional and premeditated 
use of lethal force by state actors against suspected terrorists specifi-
cally identified in advance by the perpetrator.9 About a decade ago, 
the question of the general legality of targeted killings sparked in-
tense legal, moral, philosophical, and political debates.10 Can we de-
cide to kill a specific individual without trial? Outside of a recognized 
battlefield? In her home? The very idea that wartime killing can be a 
premeditated attack against a specific individual outside of any rec-
ognized battlefield was revolutionary and encountered many dissent-
ing voices.11  
 In recent years, with the rise of the so-called “war on terror” and 
its counterterrorism policies, this general question lost most of its 
importance. Current debates no longer focus on the legality of target-
                                                                                                                       
 9. Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur), Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudi-
cial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) 
[hereinafter U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings]; see also NILS MELZER, 
TARGETED KILLINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (2008) (offering alternative definitions of 
“targeted killing”); Chris Downes, ‘Targeted Killings’ in an Age of Terror: The Legality of 
the Yemen Strike, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 277, 280 (2004); David Kretzmer, Targeted 
Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 
16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171, 176 (2005). 
 10. Kretzmer, supra note 9.  
 11. See Michael L. Gross, Assassination and Targeted Killing: Law Enforcement, Execu-
tion or Self‐Defence?, 23 J. APPLIED PHIL. 323 (2006); Georg Nolte, Preventive Use of Force and 
Preventive Killings: Moves into a Different Legal Order, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 111 
(2004); Ward Thomas, Norms and Security: The Case of International Assassination, 25 INT’L 
SECURITY 105 (2000); Howard A. Wachtel, Targeting Osama Bin Laden: Examining the Le-
gality of Assassination as a Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 677 (2005). 
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ed killing operations in general, but rather on the specific conditions 
under which targeted killing operations are permissible.12 Unfortu-
nately, these conditions and their application are ambiguous and 
open to different interpretations.13 First, there is disagreement on 
whether international human rights law (IHRL) or international 
humanitarian law (IHL) applies.14 Second, a substantial gap exists 
between permissive and restrictive legal interpretations of the sub-
stantive norms. Who constitutes a legitimate target? Does “direct 
participation” include membership in a terror organization? Or does 
it necessitate involvement in certain activities? Is it lawful to target a 
suspected terrorist at any time and place? Or are there any temporal 
or geographical restrictions to targeted killing operations?15  
 For obvious reasons, government lawyers, human rights organiza-
tions, and scholars provide different answers to these questions. Eyal 
Benvenisti argued that the content of IHL (or law of armed conflict) 
depends on the identity of the interpreting body—whether it is a gov-
ernment involved in transnational armed conflict or an international 
organization.16 With regard to targeted killings law, the gap between 
restrictive and permissive interpretations have recently reached new 
peaks. In fact, William C. Bradford, then an international law profes-
sor at West Point, went as far as interpreting international law to 
include academics criticizing the U.S. policies in the permissible tar-
gets list.17 But even within the legitimate spectrum of interpretation, 
there are fundamental disagreements between those promoting a 
                                                                                                                       
 12. See, e.g., Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted Killing, 1 
HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 145 (2010). 
 13. Michael N. Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting: Deconstructing the Logic of 
International Law, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 77, 78 (2013) (“In particular, pundits often 
ask the wrong questions or answer the right ones by reference to the wrong body of law. 
The result is growing confusion, as analytical errors persist and multiply.” (footnote omit-
ted)); see also Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in 
the International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 4 
(2010) (“The use of lethal force in response to terrorism . . . has been the subject of exten-
sive scholarship, advocacy, and litigation over the past decade . . . . Yet we remain far from 
consensus.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 14. Chesney, supra note 13, at 29-38; Sylvain Vité, Typology of Armed Conflicts in 
International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 69 (2009). 
 15. Chesney, supra note 13, at 44. These and many other disagreements concerning the 
meaning of the substantive norms on targeting are elaborated upon in Section III.C., below.  
 16. Eyal Benvenisti, The Legal Battle to Define the Law on Transnational Asymmetric 
Warfare, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 339, 358-59 (2010). 
 17. Arguing that such legal scholars may be defined as “unlawful combatants,” who 
can be targeted at any time and place, including “law school facilities, scholars’ home offic-
es, and media outlets where they give interviews.” William C. Bradford, Trahison des Pro-
fesseurs: The Critical Law of Armed Conflict Academy as an Islamist Fifth Column, 3 NAT’L 
SECURITY L.J. 278, 450 (2015). 
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permissive interpretation of targeting law and those advocating a 
restrictive interpretation of the same legal norms.18  
 In the Israeli context, during the latest hostilities between Israelis 
and Palestinians in Gaza, international law professors published—in 
real time—contrasting legal opinions interpreting IHL to allow or 
prohibit certain military actions.19 The Israeli media even went as far 
as naming those lawyers defending Israeli Defense Force (IDF) ac-
tions as “legal iron dome.”20 Unfortunately, the disagreements on the 
content of international law erode its credibility as a clear set of rules 
which guide behavior during wartime. Moreover, it increases uncer-
tainty in a field already fueled with uncertainties. Targeted decisions 
are based, primarily, on uncertain intelligence. This uncertain, lim-
ited information is interpreted by security-oriented decisionmakers 
guided by internal decisionmaking processes that cannot fully ad-
dress doubt in their highly sophisticated algorithms.  
III.   TARGETED KILLING OPERATIONS DURING ARMED CONFLICTS: 
PRESSING UNCERTAINTIES 
 Two alternative normative frameworks may apply to targeted kill-
ing operations: the law enforcement framework, and the armed con-
flict framework. The former controls law enforcement operations 
generally, while the latter controls military operations conducted 
within the context of a specific armed conflict. Much of the controver-
sy over targeted killings relates to the applicable legal framework 
and to the legal norms governing such operations. In order to focus 
the discussion on the main controversies and uncertainties concern-
ing targeting law, the following section analyzes the main areas of 
disagreement concerning targeted killings under the law of armed 
conflict.  
                                                                                                                       
 18. See infra Section III.C. (providing an elaborated analysis of these disagreements 
and legal disputes); see also Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: 
Lawyers and Torture, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 689, 690-92 (2004); see also infra notes 13-15 and 
accompanying text. 
 19. AVI BELL, ISRAEL MAY STOP SUPPLYING WATER AND ELECTRICITY TO GAZA: A 
LEGAL OPINION (2014), https://euiha41fnsb2lyeld3vkc37i-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/israel-may-stop-supplying-water-and-electricity-to-Gaza-updated.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ELD9-MYSA]; Letter from Yuval Shany et. al. on Legal Opinion Concerning 
Supply of Electricity and Water to the Gaza Strip to Members of the Foreign Affairs & Def. 
Comm. (July 20, 2014), http://gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/letters/letter-en-20-7-14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F2XU-FAYC].  
 20. “Iron Dome” is the missile defense system that protects Israeli cities from Pales-
tinian rockets. See Gilad Grossman, Legal Iron Dome, WALLA NEWS (Nov. 18, 2012), 
http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/1/2587639 [https://perma.cc/68SD-Z8FR].   
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A.   The Existence of an Armed Conflict: What is the Threshold for, 
and Territorial Boundaries of, Law of Armed Conflict? 
 1.   International v. Non-international Armed Conflict  
 While some acts of terrorism constitute domestic or international 
crimes, which should be prosecuted and dealt with by means of law 
enforcement, other acts of terrorism may rise to the level of “pro-
tracted armed violence,” thereby constituting an armed conflict.21 An 
“international armed conflict” includes conflicts between two states 
or more “leading to the intervention of members of the armed forc-
es.”22 When terrorist activities against state A can be attributed to 
state B, IHL norms governing international armed conflicts will ap-
ply to the conduct of hostilities between states A and B. For example, 
the hostilities between the United States and Afghanistan immedi-
ately following the terror attacks of 9/11 constituted an international 
armed conflict.23  
 Nonetheless, other armed conflicts between states and terrorist 
organizations do not involve more than one state, and therefore, can-
not be considered international armed conflicts. In such cases, when 
the intensity and gravity of the terrorist organization activities reach 
a high level, a “non-international armed conflict” may arise between 
the state and the terrorist organization. A “non-international armed 
conflict includes all situations of sufficiently intense or protracted 
armed violence between identifiable and organized armed groups re-
gardless of where they occur, as long as they” do not involve more 
than one state.24 It should be emphasized that not every act of vio-
lence constitutes a non-international armed conflict. “Normally, the 
use of force among private individuals, and between private individ-
uals and public authorities, is governed by domestic criminal law and 
the . . . paradigm of law enforcement.”25 In order to qualify as a non-
international armed conflict, “protracted armed violence” is re-
                                                                                                                       
 21. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interloc-
utory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 22. JEAN S. PICTET, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 COMMENTARY 20 
(1958). This definition was reaffirmed later on by the ICTY in the Delalić case. Prosecutor v. 
Deliać, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 184, 208 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo-
slavia Nov. 6, 1998); see also YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 14-16 (2004); Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (merits), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 114.   
 23. DINSTEIN, supra note 22, at 14-16; Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: 
Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 675, 713-14 (2004). 
 24. MELZER, supra note 9, at 261. 
 25. Id. at 256. 
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quired,26 and the use of force must go beyond the level of intensity of 
internal disturbances and tensions, “such as riots, isolated and spo-
radic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature.”27  
 When the hostilities or violence caused by terror organizations 
constitute an “armed conflict” (whether an international or non-
international armed conflict), the prevailing normative regime is the 
law of armed conflict (or IHL).28 While an international armed con-
flict is governed by the IHL regime, as a whole, a non-international 
armed conflict triggers only a small part of these laws—mainly com-
mon article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II Additional to 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions.29 While IHL is the lex specialis during 
an armed conflict, it is not the only applicable set of rules. In the past 
decade or so, it was gradually established that “even in the conduct of 
hostilities, the international human rights regime [still] applies, alt-
hough in part it is superseded by the lex specialis, [IHL].”30 As part of 
the lex specialis of war, IHL grants the state broad authority to kill 
enemy combatants and civilians who directly participate in the hos-
tilities. However, it also imposes significant limitations on states’ 
power and minimum standards of humane treatment of individuals.31 
In the following subsections, I shall discuss the exact limitations on 
this general authority to kill. 
 2.   Zones of Active Hostilities v. Areas Outside of “Hot Battlefields”  
 When the hostilities or violence caused by terror organizations 
constitute an “armed conflict” (whether an international or non-
                                                                                                                       
 26. Prosecutor v. Tadić Case No. IT-94-1-I, ¶ 70; Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, July 17, 1988, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, art. 8(2)(f) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 27. Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609, art. 1(2) [hereinafter APII]. 
 28. Yuval Shany, The International Struggle Against Terrorism—The Law Enforce-
ment Paradigm and the Armed Conflict Paradigm, ISR. DEMOCRACY INST., Sept. 10, 2008, 
https://en.idi.org.il/articles/6934 [https://perma.cc/9YRQ-DY4K]. 
 29. See LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 1-2 (2002). However, 
it should be noted that APII only applies to non-international armed conflicts taking place 
in the territory of a state, between its own armed forces and non-state actors. See also INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 
TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 4453, at 1349 (Yves Sandoz, Chris-
tophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY]. 
 30. Kretzmer, supra note 9, at 185; Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitar-
ian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239 (2000). This theory was adopted by the ICJ in the Nuclear 
Weapons case back in 1996, and was repeated later on in several cases, including the Wall 
Advisory Opinion. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Weapons 
Case), Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226 (July 8); Legal Consequences of the Con-
struction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Wall Advisory Opinion), Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 131 (July 9). 
 31. Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of 
Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 408 (2009). 
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international armed conflict), the prevailing normative regime is the 
law of armed conflict (or IHL).32 But does the law of armed conflict 
have geographical boundaries? On the one hand, the United States 
and its supporters argue that the conflict between the United States 
and Al-Qaida, for example, extends to wherever the alleged enemy is 
found.33 On the other hand, European states, human rights groups, 
and scholars counter that the armed conflict should be geographically 
limited to the “hot battlefields” or “active hostilities” areas in Afghan-
istan and possibly northwest Pakistan.34 Based on this view, while 
state actions within hot battlefields are subject to the laws of armed 
conflict, state actions outside these areas should generally be gov-
erned by the law enforcement model.35 Interestingly, this approach 
recently received some support from the United States itself. In the 
Drone Memo, the U.S. Department of Justice emphasized that “ac-
cording to the facts related to us, AQAP has a significant and orga-
nized presence, and from which AQAP is conducting terrorist train-
ing in an organized manner and has executed and is planning to exe-
cute attacks against the United States.”36 Ryan Goodman argues that 
by confining the use of lethal force to areas with a significant pres-
ence of enemy forces from where attacks against the United States 
are launched, the Drone Memo injects a limiting principle for the ge-
ographic scope of the conflict with Al Qaeda.37  
 Similarly, Jennifer Daskal suggests that zones of active hostilities 
should be geographically limited to areas where there is actual 
                                                                                                                       
 32. Shany, supra note 28. 
 33. See, e.g., John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Coun-
terterrorism, Remarks at the Harvard Law School Program on Law and Security, 
Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-
strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an [https://perma.cc/PFU2-HELA] (“An 
area in which there is some disagreement is the geographic scope of the conflict. The Unit-
ed States does not view our authority to use military force against al-Qa’ida as being re-
stricted solely to ‘hot’ battlefields like Afghanistan.”). 
 34. See, e.g., U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings, supra note 9, ¶¶ 53, 
68; Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and 
Targeting Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1165, 1170 n.10 (2013); Claus 
Kress, Some Reflections on the International Legal Framework Governing Transnational 
Armed Conflicts, 15 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 245, 266 (2010). 
 35. Daskal argues that the rules for targeted killings ought to distinguish between “hot 
battlefield” and elsewhere (zones outside of active hostilities). According to her view, lethal 
targeting outside a zone of active hostilities should be focused on those threats that are 
clearly tied to the zone of active hostilities and other significant and ongoing threats that 
cannot be adequately addressed through other means. See Daskal, supra note 34, at 1208. 
 36. The Drone Memo, supra note 4, at 27.  
 37. Ryan Goodman, The OLC’s Drone Memo and International Law’s Ascendance, 
JUST SECURITY (June 24, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/12142/olc-memo-drones-
international-law-goodman/ [https://perma.cc/WL7F-Z35L]. 
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fighting, a significant possibility of fighting, or preparation for 
fighting.38 In the context of terrorist activity, such areas would in-
clude those places in which active, organized terrorists are planning 
or organizing attacks, even if they are only in their preliminary plan-
ning stages, as well as places from which such attacks are launched. 
This approach is consistent with international law, which limits the 
scope of non-international armed conflicts to “protracted armed vio-
lence” involving “organized armed groups.”39 Nonetheless, such ter-
rorist activities could extend the territorial boundaries of the armed 
conflict only so long as there exists sufficient convincing information 
that a concrete terror attack is in fact underway, and so long as such 
an attack is clearly tied to the active hostilities. This means that the 
mere presence of Al-Qaeda members in Yemen, for example, does not 
necessarily expand the armed conflict regime to those areas. Any 
such individuals should generally be governed by the law enforce-
ment model, unless they present a concrete threat which is tied to 
the active zone of hostilities. 
 3.   State Sovereignty and Jurisdiction  
 While some targeted killing operations take place within the tar-
geting state’s own territory40 or in areas under its effective control,41 
others are conducted in third-parties’ territories—including 42 failed 
or quasi-states.43 The former two cases—where the operation is con-
ducted in a territory controlled by the relevant state—raise ques-
tions, mainly, relating to the legality of the relevant operation, under 
the law enforcement or the armed conflict models (depending on the 
proximity to a zone of active hostilities). The latter case—where the 
operation is conducted in the territory of another country—triggers, 
in addition to IHRL and IHL (jus in bello), the international law gov-
erning the use of force (jus ad bellum). Issues concerning the use of 
force norms that govern targeted killing operations are the subject of 
intensive scholarly writing and are beyond the scope of this Article. 
Nonetheless, the following paragraphs will briefly mention a few cen-
tral issues that add to the legal uncertainty surrounding targeted 
killing operations.    
                                                                                                                       
 38. Daskal, supra note 34, at 1170.  
 39. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interloc-
utory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 40. Such as the Russian targeted killing operations against Chechen rebels. 
 41. Such as the Israeli targeted killing operations in the West Bank. 
 42. Such as the U.S. targeted killing operations in Yemen or Pakistan. 
 43. Possibly, such as the Israeli targeted killing operations in Gaza after the disengagement.  
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 It is a basic principle of international law that a country is prohib-
ited from engaging in law enforcement operations in the territory of 
another country.44 This prohibition carries particular weight when 
such law enforcement operations involve killing a person. Deadly at-
tacks by air strikes or drones clearly violate the international prohi-
bition on the use of force between states.45 
 Under the norms governing use of force, a targeted killing opera-
tion may be based on self-defense—an exception to the international 
law prohibition on the use of force. A successful self-defense argu-
ment must be based on attribution of the terror attack to the relevant 
state, as well as on the gravity of the attack.46 International law per-
mits the use of lethal force in self-defense in response to an “armed 
attack” as long as that force is necessary and proportionate.47  
 If the terror attack cannot be attributed to a state, a targeted kill-
ing operation on the territory of a neutral state should consider the 
principle of sovereignty and must be based either on the consent of that 
state, or on its inability or unwillingness to interdict the terrorists.48  
B.   Military Necessity: What Justifies the Use of Lethal Force? 
 One of the fundamental–yet elusive–principles of IHL is military 
necessity.49 According to the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War 
Manual, military necessity is so difficult to define and apply that dif-
ferent people often assess military necessity differently.50 According 
to the Law of War Manual, necessity depends closely on the specific 
facts and circumstances of a given situation, as well as those inter-
preting and giving meaning to these facts and circumstances. This 
task becomes even more challenging due to the “limited and unrelia-
ble nature of information available during war.”51 
                                                                                                                       
 44. See generally U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 4, 7. 
 45. Blum & Heymann, supra note 12, at 161. 
 46. NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 25-
63 (2010) (discussing the norms and limitations regulating a “self-defense” operation).  
 47. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 
(merits), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 194. 
 48. LUBELL, supra note 46, at 70; Blum & Heymann, supra note 12, at 164. Downes 
adds that the armed forces may be invited to assist a state in maintaining order, for example, 
through law enforcement and the suppression of the rebels. See Downes, supra note 9, at 280. 
 49. Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Lim-
its of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 213 (1998); Michael N. Schmitt, 
Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Deli-
cate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 796 (2010). 
 50. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL 56 (2015) 
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Law-of-War-Manual-June-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A2EK-M3MJ].  
 51. Id.  
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 Indeed, there are two main approaches to military necessity—a 
restrictive approach and a permissive approach. According to the 
permissive approach, military necessity justifies the use of all 
measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently as 
possible that are not prohibited by the law of war.52 Based on this 
understanding of military necessity, the principle is almost never in-
voked in the context of targeted killing as it is assumed that the use 
of lethal force against members of terrorist organizations is justified 
under this standard.  
 A different, more restrictive approach to military necessity adopts 
a limiting, rather than justifying, interpretation of military necessity. 
According to the restrictive approach, military necessity requires the 
kind and degree of force resorted to being necessary for the achieve-
ment of a concrete and legitimate military advantage, and that it 
must not otherwise be prohibited under IHL.53 In order for considera-
tions of military necessity to override humanitarian considerations, 
the military necessity must be “concrete, direct and definite,”54 and 
the operation must be likely to contribute effectively to the achieve-
ment of a concrete and direct military advantage.55 The restrictive 
approach to military necessity also forbids the infliction of suffering, 
injury, or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment 
of legitimate military purposes.56 This means that there is an obliga-
tion to attempt an arrest rather than to kill if the circumstances indi-
cate a reasonable probability of success without undue risk. While 
some have criticized this approach,57 it gets support from a historical 
analysis of this principle. Tracing the historical origins of the mili-
tary necessity principle, Burrus Carnahan argued that the Lieber 
Code’s greatest theoretical contribution to the modern law of war was 
its identification of military necessity as a general legal principle to 
limit violence.58 
                                                                                                                       
 52. Id. at 52. 
 53. MELZER, supra note 9, at 286. 
 54. Id. at 292-93. 
 55. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3, art. 52(2) [hereinafter API]; Barrack Obama, President of the U.S., Speech at 
National Defense University in Washington, D.C.: National Security (May 23, 2013) [here-
inafter Obama, Speech at National Defense University], https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university [https://perma.cc/ 
4C4D-VMJ2]. 
 56. MELZER, supra note 9, at 108-09. 
 57. See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: 
No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769, 771-72 (2010). 
 58. Carnahan, supra note 49, at 230. 
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 The context of counterterrorism operations—and specifically those 
involving the use of lethal force—presents a perfect opportunity to 
reestablish the limiting nature of military necessity. In traditional 
warfare, any combatant (who is not hors de combat) is a legitimate 
military target whose killing is considered to meet the test of military 
necessity. As members of terror organizations are not combatants, 
targeting them could be justified by military necessity if their death 
generates a concrete, direct, and definite military advantage. Hence, 
determining that it is necessary to kill a suspected terrorist requires 
concrete and updated evidence to this effect.  
 This is the declared policy of the current U.S. administration. In 
his speech at Northwestern University School of Law in March 2012, 
then-U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder stated that targeted killings 
are only lawful and legitimate when the targeted individual poses an 
imminent threat of violent attack against the United States.59 And in 
his 2013 annual national security speech, President Obama stated 
that “we act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent 
threat to the American people.”60 Similarly, the killing of Anwar Al-
Awlaqi was justified by U.S. policymakers as a necessary means to 
respond to a “continued and imminent” threat.61 Unfortunately, it left 
open important questions concerning how this determination was 
made, the level of proof required, and the quantity and quality of the 
required evidence to make such a determination. Most importantly, it 
is unclear how a necessity requirement, based on the existence of a 
concrete and imminent threat, could be determined about fourteen 
months before the actual use of lethal force.62 
C.   The Principle of Distinction: Who Can be Targeted? 
 1.   The Basic Rule 
 In an armed conflict paradigm, the lawfulness of an intentional 
killing operation depends, predominantly, on the distinction between 
                                                                                                                       
 59. Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Speech at Northwestern University School of Law 
(Mar. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Holder’s Speech], https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-
general-eric-holder-speaks-northwestern-university-school-law [https://perma.cc/FG3A-YNAW]; 
see also DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 6-7. Nonetheless, the White Paper demon-
strates the need to carefully interpret such a requirement. While the White Paper requires 
the existence of an “imminent threat of violent attack,” it later explains that such an im-
minent threat does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific 
attack will take place in the immediate future. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 6-7. 
 60. Obama, Speech at National Defense University, supra note 55. 
 61. The Drone Memo, supra note 4.  
 62. For further discussion of these issues, see Jennifer Daskal, Reflections on What 
the Drone Memo Does and Doesn’t Say, JUST SECURITY (June 24, 2014), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/12104/reflections-drone-memo/ [https://perma.cc/7SFL-G7D6].   
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legitimate military targets and protected civilians.63 As a general 
rule, the principle of distinction permits direct attacks only against 
the armed forces of the parties to the conflict, while the peaceful civil-
ian population must be spared and protected from the effects of the 
hostilities.64 Nevertheless, this general rule has several important 
exceptions. First, combatants cannot be targeted while they are hors 
de combat (i.e., have surrendered, are wounded, or are otherwise in-
capable of fighting). Second, civilians are not always protected 
against direct attack; they are legitimate targets while directly par-
ticipating in the hostilities.65 Therefore, the category of persons who 
do not benefit from immunity against direct attack includes not only 
combatants but also civilians directly participating in the hostilities, 
as well as medical, religious, and civil defense personnel of the armed 
forces—or persons hors de combat who commit hostile acts despite 
the special protection afforded to them.66 
 2.   Distinction and Suspected Terrorists  
 Applying the principle of distinction to attacks directed against 
suspected terrorists poses a new challenge, as it is unclear to which 
of the above-mentioned categories suspected terrorists belong. In re-
cent years, state practice, as well as academic literature, characterize 
suspected terrorists differently: as civilians (who sometimes or con-
stantly directly participate in the hostilities), or as combatants (or 
more frequently, “unlawful combatants”). Numerous legal documents 
and articles have been written on this topic, claiming that interna-
tional law dictates one characterization or another.67 The significance 
                                                                                                                       
 63. API, supra note 55, art. 48. 
 64. MELZER, supra note 9, at 300-01; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weap-
ons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8). 
 65. API, supra note 55, art. 51(3); APII, supra note 27, arts. 1(2), 13(3). For a thorough 
normative and practical interpretation of the meaning of “direct participation,” see infra 
Section III.C.3. 
 66. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field art. 24, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 26, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; 
API, supra note 55, arts. 12(1), 41(1), 41(2), 67(1). While this terminology and these refer-
ences relate to international armed conflict, the same basic distinctions and protections 
against direct attacks apply to non-international armed conflict as well. See APII, supra 
note 27, arts. 4(1), 7(1), 9(1), 13; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; see also 
MELZER, supra note 9, at 314.  
 67. See, e.g., Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions, 44 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 1025 (2004); Knut Dormann, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged” 
Combatants, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 45 (2003); Michael H. Hoffman, Terrorists Are Un-
lawful Belligerents, Not Unlawful Combatants: A Distinction with Implications for the Fu-
ture of International Humanitarian Law, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 227 (2002); Gerald L. 
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of this characterization lies in its normative implications: the Third 
Geneva Convention applies to combatants; the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention applies to civilians; and only common article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions (along with the “Martens Clause”) applies to “unlawful 
combatants.”68   
 The U.S. Supreme Court, as well as the Israeli High Court of Jus-
tice (HCJ), have determined that terrorists cannot be characterized 
as “combatants,” as they typically do not fulfill the requirements 
specified in article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention.69 Nonetheless, 
the two courts reached different conclusions: the HCJ, on the one 
hand, concluded that suspected terrorists should be treated as civil-
ians, who may lose their protections while directly participating in 
the hostilities;70 and the U.S. Supreme Court, on the other hand, con-
cluded that suspected terrorists should be treated as “unlawful com-
batants”71—a term that does not appear in any of the Geneva or 
Hague Conventions, regulations, or protocols. Therefore, they enjoy 
only the limited protections accorded by common article 3 of the Ge-
neva Conventions. While the difference between these approaches 
may seem significant, it largely depends upon the meaning and in-
terpretation of direct participation in hostilities (DPH). When inter-
preted loosely, the DPH approach can lead to similar outcomes and 
limited protections as the “unlawful combatant” approach.   
 3.   “Direct Participation in Hostilities” 
 Legal scholars, judges, and policymakers around the world have 
been grappling with this question for many years without reaching 
an agreed-upon solution. While the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary on the notion of DPH equates it to 
“acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause ac-
                                                                                                                       
Neuman, Humanitarian Law and Counterterrorist Force, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 283 (2003); 
Nolte, supra note 11; Kenneth Watkin, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivi-
leged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy, HARV. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN 
POL’Y & CONFLICT RES. OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, No. 2, Winter 2005; Shlomy Zachary, 
Between the Geneva Conventions: Where Does the Unlawful Combatant Belong?, 38 ISR. L. 
REV. 378 (2005). 
 68. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631 (2006). 
 69. In its Targeted Killing Case, the Israeli High Court of Justice held that members of 
terrorist organizations have the status of civilians, whose protections under international law 
applies as long as they do not directly participate in the hostilities. See HCJ 769/02 Pub. 
Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t. of Israel, 57(6) PD 285, ¶¶ 25-28 (2005) (Isr.), 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QLK-
XVKH]. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 557. 
2017]  RETHINKING TARGETED KILLING  
 
959 
tual harm,”72 others support more liberal interpretations of the term. 
Michael Schmitt, for example, argues that “[g]ray areas should be 
interpreted liberally, i.e., in favor of finding direct participation.”73 In 
his view, suggesting that civilians retain their immunity even when 
they are intricately involved in a conflict will only engender disre-
spect for the law by combatants endangered by such civilian in-
volvement.74 Moreover, Schmitt argues that only a more liberal inter-
pretation of direct participation will provide the necessary incentive 
for civilians to remain as distant from the conflict as possible.75  
 Against this view, many consider such a liberal interpretation to 
be an unacceptable erosion of civilian protection,76 and they advocate 
a restrictive approach to the term direct participation.77 Nils Melzer 
concludes that DPH includes:  
[A]ny hostile act that is specifically designed to support one party 
to an armed conflict by directly causing—on its own or as an inte-
gral part of a concrete and coordinated military operation—harm 
to the military operations or military capacity of another party, or 
death, injury or destruction to persons or objects protected against 
direct attack.78  
 Kenneth Watkin, following the restrictive ICRC approach to direct 
participation, emphasizes three cumulative criteria necessary to 
meet the requirement of DPH: (1) threshold of harm, (2) direct causa-
tion, and (3) belligerent nexus.79 The threshold of harm test is met 
“by causing harm of a specifically military nature or by inflicting 
death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected from di-
rect attack.”80 The materialization of the harm is based on an objec-
tive likelihood or a threshold of harm “which may reasonably be ex-
pected to result from an act in the prevailing circumstances.”81 The 
ICRC DPH Guidance significantly narrows the definition of activities 
                                                                                                                       
 72. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 1944 (discussing commentary on article 51 of API). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Michael N. Schmitt, “Direct Participation in Hostilities” and 21st Century Armed 
Conflict, in CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION 505-09 (Horst Fischer et 
al. eds., 2004). 
 75. Id. at 509. 
 76. MELZER, supra note 9, at 341.  
 77. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 29, ¶ 1945; NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 44-45 (2009) [hereinafter ICRC DPH GUIDANCE], 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LLR-UW4W]; 
Watkin, supra note 67, at 657-60. 
 78. MELZER, supra note 9, at 343.  
 79. Watkin, supra note 67, at 31-33. 
 80. ICRC DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 77, at 47. 
 81. Id.  
  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:943 
 
 
960 
that might constitute DPH based on the requirement of a direct 
causal link between the specific act and the likelihood of harm. It 
does this by introducing the concept of “one causal step,”82 meaning 
that anything that simply builds up the capacity of a party to inflict 
harm “is excluded from the concept of [DPH].”83 The Interpretive 
Guidance excludes the production and transport of weapons and 
equipment unless those acts are carried out as an integral part of a 
particular military operation specifically designed to directly cross 
the threshold of harm.84 Similarly, recruitment, training, and plan-
ning activities will meet this criterion only if such activities are spe-
cifically conducted to enable the execution of a concrete operation.85 
The final criterion is the belligerent nexus: where an act must not 
only be linked to the first two criteria, but also be specifically de-
signed to support a party to the conflict.86  
 In its judgment on the legality of targeted killings, the HCJ 
adopted a broader and less restrictive test of functionality in order to 
determine the directness of the part taken in the hostilities. Accord-
ing to this test, a civilian directly participates in the hostilities when 
he performs the functions of a combatant.87 By applying the test of 
functionality, the court therefore held that the following cases consti-
tute direct participation: a person who collects intelligence on the 
army, “whether on issues regarding the hostilities . . . or beyond 
those issues”;88 a person who transports unlawful combatants to or 
from the place where the hostilities are taking place; and a person 
who operates weapons which unlawful combatants use, supervises 
their operation, or provides service to them—regardless of the dis-
tance from the battlefield. The court went on to decide that civilians 
serving as “human shields” for terrorists taking direct part in the 
hostilities, of their own free will out of support for the terrorist organ-
ization, should be seen as persons taking a direct part in the hostili-
ties.89 Furthermore, the court determined that the directness of par-
ticipation should not be restricted merely to the person committing 
the physical act of attack. “Those who have sent him, as well, take ‘a 
direct part.’ The same goes for the person who decided upon the act, 
                                                                                                                       
 82. Id. at 53. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Watkin, supra note 67, at 658. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.; ICRC DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 77, at 63. 
 87. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t. of Israel, 57(6) PD 285, 
¶¶ 25-28 (2005) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6QLK-XVKH]. 
 88. Id. ¶ 35. 
 89. Id. ¶ 36. 
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and the person who planned it.”90 With regard to persons who sell 
food or medicine to an unlawful combatant; persons who aid the un-
lawful combatants by general strategic analysis and provide them 
with logistic or general support, including monetary aid; or persons 
who distribute propaganda supporting those unlawful combatants, the 
court determined that they take an indirect part in the hostilities.91 
 The U.N. Report also adopted a test of functionality. Nonetheless, 
it interpreted this test narrowly, determining that direct participa-
tion may include only “conduct close to that of a fighter, or conduct 
that directly supports combat.”92 More attenuated acts, such as 
providing financial support, advocacy, supplying food or shelter, eco-
nomic support and propaganda, or other non-combat aid, do not con-
stitute direct participation.93 While the obvious cases—such as vio-
lent and active combat operations—do not raise many difficulties, 
there is still much room left for debate with regard to the many grey 
areas. These areas include various preparatory or supporting 
measures, such as gathering intelligence information, planning of 
hostilities or other violent activities, recruitment of personnel, 
transmission of fighters or weapons to the battlefield, and voluntarily 
serving as “human shields” for terrorists taking a direct part in the 
hostilities. Moreover, it seems that the main difference between the 
ICRC causality approach and the HCJ functionality approach is that 
the former focuses on concrete terrorist attacks which are underway, 
while the latter focuses on the general combat role within the organi-
zation (which is not necessarily linked to a concrete terrorist attack). 
 The use of human shields can serve to illustrate the differences 
between these two approaches. The HCJ’s test of functionality treats 
voluntary human shields as legitimate targets under all circum-
stances. In contrast, the ICRC nuanced approach examines their ex-
act activity, and the way in which they participate in the hostilities. 
Specifically, the ICRC’s approach treats voluntary human shields as 
legitimate targets only if by their activity they pose a physical obsta-
cle to military operations (i.e., blocking the soldiers with their bodies 
and interfering with their activities). In contrast, the ICRC’s ap-
proach treats voluntary human shields as protected persons if their 
presence on site only poses a legal (and not physical) obstacle (i.e., 
shifts the proportionality calculations).94 The focus of this test is not 
activity based but rather status based and, therefore, deviates from 
                                                                                                                       
 90. Id. ¶ 37. 
 91. Id. ¶ 35. 
 92. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings, supra note 9, ¶ 60. 
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the language, purpose, and framework of article 51(3) of Protocol I 
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which sets an activity-
based norm. Using this mixed activity-based and causality-oriented 
test serves several goals: it sets practical and clear limitations on 
targeted killings; it satisfies the prevention purpose of targeted kill-
ing operations; it distinguishes suspected criminals (who should be 
caught and prosecuted) from individuals who are currently in the 
midst of planning or executing a concrete attack; and it enables mak-
ing this distinction ex ante, since it narrows obscure grey areas. 
 4.   “For Such Time” 
 Civilians lose their protections only “for such time” as they direct-
ly participate in the hostilities.95 The ICRC DPH Guidance distin-
guishes between temporary, activity-based loss of protection (dis-
cussed in Section III.B. above), and continuous status or function-
based loss of protection (due to combatant status or continuous com-
bat function).96 According to the first category, activity-based, the loss 
of civilian protections applies to the immediate execution phase of a 
specific act meeting the three criteria for direct participation in hos-
tiles of threshold of harm, direct causation, and belligerent nexus, as 
well as to measures preparatory to the execution of such an act or 
deployment to and return from the location of its execution, where 
they constitute an integral part of such a specific act or operation.97 
The second category, continuous combat function, requires lasting 
integration into an organized armed group acting as the armed forces 
of a non-state party to an armed conflict.98 Thus, individuals whose 
continuous functions involve the preparation, execution, or command 
of acts or operations amounting to DPH, are assuming a continuous 
combat function. An individual recruited, trained, and equipped by 
such a group to continuously and directly participate in hostilities on 
its behalf can be considered to assume a continuous combat function 
even before he or she first carries out a hostile act. Nonetheless, re-
cruiters, trainers, financiers, and propagandists, as well as those 
purchasing, smuggling, manufacturing, and maintaining weapons 
and other equipment outside specific military operations, or collect-
ing intelligence other than of a tactical nature, are not considered 
                                                                                                                       
 95. API, supra note 55, art. 51(3); APII, supra note 27, art. 13(3). The ICRC Custom-
ary IHL study considers the rule to be of customary nature for both types of conflicts. 1 
JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 19 r.6 (2005). 
 96. ICRC DPH GUIDANCE, supra note 77, at 43-44. 
 97. Id. at 65. 
 98. Id. at 34. 
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members of an organized armed group.99 The ICRC DPH Guidance 
emphasizes that a continuous combat function may be openly ex-
pressed through the carrying of uniforms, distinctive signs, or certain 
weapons. Yet it may also be identified on the basis of conclusive be-
havior. For example, where a person has on repeated occasions di-
rectly participated in hostilities in support of an organized armed 
group in circumstances indicating that such conduct constitutes a 
continuous function rather than a spontaneous, sporadic, or tempo-
rary role assumed for the duration of a particular operation.100 
 The HCJ has made a somewhat similar distinction between civil-
ians taking a direct part in hostilities on a one-time basis or sporadi-
cally, and those who continuously perform combat functions and 
commit a chain of hostilities with short periods of rest between them. 
The court determined that those belonging to the first group are enti-
tled to resume their civilian protections once they have detached 
themselves from that sporadic activity, while those belonging to the 
second group lose their civilian protections completely as of the time 
they join the terror organization. To support this decision, the court 
raised the need to avoid the “revolving door” phenomenon, with each 
terrorist having a “city of refuge” to flee to, in order to rest and pre-
pare themselves for the next combat activity.101 The court further dis-
cussed the “grey area” cases, in between these two extreme scenarios, 
and determined that each case must be examined according to its 
specific circumstances.102  
 While the HCJ approach is less nuanced and less restrictive than 
the ICRC approach, both resemble one another in that they implicitly 
recognize a third category not included in the Geneva Conventions: 
individuals whose direct participation in the hostilities is indefinite. 
While the ICRC DPH Guidance significantly narrows the substantive 
scope of civilians who fall under this category, it deprives them of 
their civilian status altogether. Eliminating the “for such time” re-
quirement from the definition of DPH will result in creating a group 
of civilians who are constant targets based on limited intelligence 
information. As with the substantive scope of DPH, the definition of 
its temporal scope also leaves many grey areas and unanswered 
questions, including the following: How many activities does it take 
for a civilian to indefinitely lose their protections, and for how long 
                                                                                                                       
 99. Id. at 34-35. 
 100. Id. at 35. 
 101. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t. of Israel, 57(6) PD 
285, ¶ 40 (2005) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6QLK-XVKH].  
 102. Id. 
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are those protections lost? How much time can pass between one ac-
tivity and the next? And how can a person reverse such a classifica-
tion? Since membership in a terrorist organization is often vague, 
voluntary, and less organized or constructed than military or even 
guerrilla forces, such an approach suffers from inherent difficulties in 
terms of proving membership (or lack thereof).  
 Therefore, the temporal scope of “direct participation” (the “for 
such time” requirement) should only include individuals who actively 
and directly participate in any preparatory or execution stage of a 
concrete attack. This is not to say that combatant-like terrorists are 
protected: they can always be targeted on the battlefields, carrying 
out operations or even outside of hot battlefields, while planning a 
concrete attack that is underway. But they cannot be targeted at all 
times. For example, while sleeping in their beds at home, next to 
their children, when they are not involved in the planning or execut-
ing of a concrete attack. To clarify, states should not be required to 
provide evidence regarding the thoughts of suspected terrorists at 
any given moment and attack them only when they are thinking 
about a concrete terror attack, nor should they be required to present 
visual evidence of an imminent danger. States should be required, 
however, to present clear and convincing information according to 
which a killing target is indeed currently involved in an ongoing at-
tack. If that is the case, that person can be targeted at any time while 
this plot is underway. This requirement is consistent with the pre-
ventive rationale that justifies targeted killing operations to begin 
with: the notion that it is intended to frustrate a future attack.  
 The HCJ’s “revolving door” rationale should similarly be rejected: 
since DPH status is activity-based, the fact that an individual can 
only be targeted at a time and place where they engage in combatant-
activities does not constitute a “city of refuge,” but rather limits the 
legal justifications for targeting and killing this person to the time 
and place where they actually engage in such activities. The question 
here is not whether suspected terrorists are immune from state ac-
tions, but rather when is it lawful to kill them, outside of “hot battle-
fields,” without warning, and without due process. 
D.   Proportionality: How Many Civilians Can Lawfully Be Killed? 
 The principle of proportionality is part of customary IHL applica-
ble both in international and non-international armed conflicts.103 A 
targeted killing operation, which is militarily necessary and is di-
rected against an individual representing a legitimate military objec-
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tive, must additionally comply with the principle of proportionality. 
According to the principle of proportionality, launching an attack 
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct mili-
tary advantage anticipated, is prohibited.104 In contrast to the propor-
tionality assessment under the law enforcement paradigm, the main 
focus of the principle of proportionality during the conduct of hostili-
ties is not the damage or harm caused to those persons who are the 
target of the operation, but the “collateral damage” inflicted on peace-
ful bystanders.105  
 In the Targeted Killing Case, then-Israeli Supreme Court Presi-
dent Aharon Barak held that the principle of proportionality applies 
to targeted killing operations on two distinct levels. First, it is neces-
sary that the anticipated collateral damage (i.e., harm to innocent 
civilians and bystanders) will not be excessive as compared to the 
anticipated military advantage. Second, with regard to the intention-
al targets, the court determined that lethal force should not be used if 
other, less harmful means are available.106   
 The determination that the principle of proportionality requires 
states to use lethal force only as a last resort was criticized in the lit-
erature.107 Nonetheless, then-U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder has 
stated that targeted killings are only lawful and legitimate when cap-
ture is not feasible.108 Additionally, the U.S. Drone Memo suggests 
that targeted killings would violate the Fourth Amendment if cap-
ture was feasible.109 The inclusion of a “last resort” requirement as a 
part of the proportionality principle is especially important, as the 
principle of proportionality stricto senso has no agreed-upon content, 
and is open to conflicting interpretations. One commentator, who had 
previously served as a military lawyer for twenty years, stated that 
“a human rights lawyer and an experienced combat commander 
would probably not assign the same relative values to military ad-
                                                                                                                       
 104. Id.   
 105. MELZER, supra note 9, at 359; see also Rome Statute, supra note 26, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
 106. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t. of Israel, 57(6) PD 
285, ¶ 40 (2005) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6QLK-XVKH]. 
 107. Amichai Cohen & Yuval Shany, A Development of Modest Proportions: The Appli-
cation of the Principle of Proportionality in the Targeted Killings Case, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 310, 315 (2007). 
 108. Holder’s Speech, supra note 59.  
 109. The Drone Memo, supra note 4, at 41. Nonetheless, it is still silent with regard to 
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vantage and to injury to noncombatants.”110 Since this test is normal-
ly applied by military personnel, and not by human rights activists, 
this assessment demonstrates how the vagueness of the principle of 
proportionality is likely to dictate its actual implementation.  
E.   Precaution: How Feasible Should Alternative Measures Be? 
 The principle of precaution in attack, which is considered to be of 
customary nature both in international and non-international armed 
conflicts,111 aims to prevent erroneous targeting and to minimize in-
cidental harm to civilians during the conduct of hostilities.112 Accord-
ing to the ICRC IHL Project, the principle of precaution contains sev-
eral distinct obligations for those planning and deciding upon an at-
tack and for those responsible for its actual conduct. These obliga-
tions include: (1) the duty to do everything feasible to verify that the 
objectives to be attacked are legitimate military objectives;113 (2) the 
duty to take all feasible precautions in the choice of the means and 
methods to be used in the attack, in order to avoid, or at least mini-
mize, incidental harm to civilians;114 (3) the duty to do everything 
feasible to assess whether the attack may be expected to cause collat-
eral damage which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated, and if so, refrain from deciding 
to launch that attack;115 and (d) the duty to do everything feasible to 
cancel or suspend the attack if it becomes apparent that the target is 
not a military objective or that the attack may be expected to cause 
excessive collateral damage.116 “Feasible precautions” are “precau-
tions which are practicable or practically possible taking into account 
                                                                                                                       
 110. William J. Fenrick, Applying IHL Targeting Rules to Practical Situations: Propor-
tionality and Military Objectives, 27 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 271, 279 (2009). Schmitt 
emphasizes the case-by-case analysis required by the application of this principle: “Multi-
ple civilian casualties may not be excessive when attacking a senior leader of the enemy 
forces, but even a single civilian casualty may be excessive if the enemy soldiers killed are 
of little importance or pose no threat.” Michael N. Schmitt, Unmanned Combat Aircraft 
Systems and International Humanitarian Law: Simplifying the Oft Benighted Debate, 30 
B.U. INT’L L.J. 595, 616 (2012); see also McNeal, supra note 7, at 750.  
 111. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 95, at 51 rr.15-21. 
 112. API, supra note 55, art. 57. 
 113. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 95, at 55 r.16; API, supra note 55, art. 
57(2)(a)(i). 
 114. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 95, at 56 r.17; API, supra note 55, art. 
57(2)(a)(ii). 
 115. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 95, at 58 r.18; API, supra note 55, art. 
57(2)(a)(iii). 
 116. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 95, at 60 r.19; API, supra note 55, art. 
57(2)(b). 
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all circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and 
military considerations.”117 
 The efforts to provide substantive content and practical tests to 
the principle of precaution are valuable. Nonetheless, it still relies 
heavily on vague definitions, to be interpreted by the security author-
ities in real time. 
F.   Transparency and Accountability: How Much  
We Still Don’t Know? 
 Both human rights norms and IHL obligate states to effectively 
investigate any alleged violations of the right to life.118 Effective in-
vestigations necessitate, among other things, a meaningful degree of 
transparency.119 Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights has 
long insisted that “[t]here must be a sufficient element of public scru-
tiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in 
practice as well as in theory, maintain public confidence in the au-
thorities’ adherence to the rule of law and prevent any appearance of 
collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts.”120 Transparency in this 
regard relates to all aspects of targeted killing operations: from the 
relevant normative standards (national and international), to the de-
cisionmaking process, to the operational responsibility,121 and finally, 
to the investigations of alleged violations. The importance of such 
transparency is emphasized by a former member of the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s Directorate of Operations, who stressed 
that CIA agents “lack detailed rules of engagement, standing orders, 
and international conventions to define limits of behavior.”122  
 National investigatory procedures must meet two different levels 
of accountability. The first is that national procedures must meet cer-
tain standards of transparency and accountability in order to comply 
with existing international obligations. The second is that the na-
                                                                                                                       
 117. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Ef-
fects, art. 3, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137; see also Jean-François Quéguiner, Precautions 
under the Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 793 (2006). 
 118. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.  
 119. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings, supra note 9,  ¶¶ 88, 90. 
 120. Anguelova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 38361/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 140 (2002).  
 121. A degree of transparency in relation to operational responsibility is essential both 
in terms of facilitating public or political accountability, and of establishing whether opera-
tions are being conducted with the necessary legal authority under domestic law. U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings, supra note 9, ¶¶ 91-92. 
 122. James M. Olson, Intelligence and the War on Terror: How Dirty Are We Willing to 
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tional procedures must themselves be sufficiently transparent to in-
ternational bodies as to permit the latter to make their own assess-
ment of the extent to which the state concerned is in compliance with 
its obligations.123 Effective accountability may have various dimen-
sions, including: (1) internal control within the relevant security 
agencies; (2) executive oversight over the relevant security agencies; 
(3) parliamentary oversight over the relevant security agencies; (4) 
judicial review, which is able to independently and effectively review 
alleged violations—including those committed by decisionmakers 
from the highest political level; and (5) external oversight, which in-
cludes civil society and the media.124  
 When it comes to targeted killing operations, each of these ac-
countability mechanisms faces difficulties. The reliance on secret in-
telligence information poses a significant challenge to legal, political 
and external accountability: “increased secrecy has impacted upon 
the legislative and judiciary branches’ ability to oversee and review 
intelligence activities.”125 The U.N. Report on targeted killings con-
cluded that “[t]he failure of States to disclose their criteria for [DPH] 
is deeply problematic because it gives no transparency or clarity 
about what conduct could subject a civilian to killing.”126  
 In addition to lack of information, both legal and political over-
sight mechanisms suffer from an expertise problem.127 The executive 
branch simply knows more about how they conduct targeted killings 
than the legislature that oversees it. As American scholars have not-
ed, with respect to congressional oversight of the executive branch, 
this expertise advantage enables the executive branch to shield cer-
tain activities from oversight because Congress is comparatively dis-
advantaged with regard to the knowledge necessary to ask the right 
questions.128 Amy Zegart points out that Congress is not designed to 
oversee intelligence agencies well since the congressional intelligence 
committees have been traditionally conducting oversight with limited 
expertise and weak budgetary authority.129  
                                                                                                                       
 123. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings, supra note 9, ¶¶ 88-91.  
 124. Id. ¶¶ 88-91. For a criticism of media oversight concerning state secrets, see 
GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, NECESSARY SECRETS: NATIONAL SECURITY, THE MEDIA, AND THE 
RULE OF LAW (2010). 
 125. Damien Van Puyvelde, Intelligence Accountability and the Role of Public Interest 
Groups in the United States, 128 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SECURITY 139, 147 (2013) (citing PHILIP 
B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR 155-60 (2003)).   
 126. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings, supra note 9, ¶ 68. 
 127. McNeal, supra note 7, at 774. 
 128. Id. at 774. 
 129. Amy B. Zegart, The Domestic Politics of Irrational Intelligence Oversight, 126 POL. 
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 As for internal and executive oversight, these, too, are inherently 
compromised by secrecy, the high-risk nature of the threat, and the 
bureaucratic nature of the decisionmaking process with respect to 
targeted killing operations. These conditions contribute to the devel-
opment of groupthink dynamics,130 which can lead to suboptimal de-
cisionmaking. Groupthink fosters excessive optimism, lack of vigi-
lance, and stereotypical thinking about out-groups, and at the same 
time causes members “to ignore negative information by viewing 
messengers of bad news as people who ‘don’t get it.’ ”131 Under group-
think conditions, it may be difficult to stop a targeted killing opera-
tion once it has begun. As Klaidman notes:   
The military was a juggernaut. They had overwhelmed the session 
with their sheer numbers, their impenetrable jargon, and their 
ability to create an atmosphere of do-or-die urgency. How could 
anybody, let alone a humanitarian law professor, resist such pow-
erful momentum? Koh was no wallflower when it came to express-
ing his views; normally he relished battling it out with his bureau-
cratic rivals. But on this occasion he’d felt powerless. Trying to stop 
a targeted killing “would be like pulling a lever to stop a massive 
freight train barreling down the tracks” he confided to a friend.132  
Moreover, “the collectivity itself may have caused an error while the 
public has no individual to hold to account.”133 
 The importance of identifying an effective accountability mecha-
nism for targeted killing operations motivated the HCJ to introduce a 
legal requirement of ex-post review, which is subject to judicial su-
pervision.134 Daniel Byman has urged the United States to follow the 
Israeli targeted killing policy, including its openness about the policy, 
its procedures for authorizing killings, and its provision of some form 
of legal review over the decisionmaking process.135 Unfortunately, a 
detailed analysis of such an Israeli ex-post investigatory mecha-
nism—the Shehadeh Commission—demonstrates the weaknesses of 
                                                                                                                       
 130. A phenomenon defined by Irving Janis as “a mode of thinking that people engage 
in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for 
unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.” 
IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 9 
(2d ed. 1982). 
 131. Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1233, 1258 (2003). 
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OBAMA PRESIDENCY 202 (2012) (emphasis added).  
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 134. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t. of Israel, 57(6) PD 285, 
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state-sponsored investigations of targeted killing operations, and 
casts a shadow over their potential to meaningfully challenge the po-
sition of the security agencies.136 
IV.   TARGETING DECISIONS AND UNCERTAINTY 
 Thus far, this Article has established the uncertainty that cur-
rently exists regarding crucial aspects of targeted killing law. Gov-
ernment officials, military personnel, and legal scholars adopt differ-
ent interpretations of the relevant norms and thus reach conflicting 
conclusions regarding the legality of targeted killing operations. This 
Part will analyze another source of confusion regarding the legality of 
targeted killing operations, this time with a focus on the deci-
sionmaking processes and the implementation of the relevant law. 
The main argument is that the centrality of intelligence information 
and schemes of secrecy increases the risk of error and inherently 
jeopardizes civilians. 
A.   Intelligence and The Risk of Error  
 When successful, a targeted killing operation is an irreversible 
measure. Unlike detention regimes, it is designed to kill, not capture. 
The legality of this deadly measure depends on the concrete circum-
stances of each case and rests mainly on the availability of intelli-
gence information concerning the severity of the security threat, the 
activities of the targeted individual, the existence or inexistence of 
feasible, less harmful measures, and the anticipated collateral dam-
age. It is not the “heat of the battle” or immediate eye-sight evidence 
that drive the killing decisionmaking process, but rather a rational 
and calculated bureaucratic decisionmaking process, which is based 
on secret information that the targeted individual cannot challenge. 
 Therefore, the legality of a targeted killing operation is heavily 
dependent upon the quality, breadth, and reliability of the intelli-
gence on which it is based.137 How well that information is document-
ed, how closely that information is scrutinized, and by whom that 
information is documented and scrutinized by are key factors in any 
assessment of targeted killing operations.138 Social-psychology studies 
long ago demonstrated that individuals tend to search and absorb 
information that is in line with their core social beliefs while omitting 
                                                                                                                       
 136. See infra Section VI.E. 
 137. U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings, supra note 9, ¶¶ 83-86; see also 
Report of the Special Investigatory Commission on the Target Killing of Salah Shehadeh 
(Feb. 27, 2011) (in Hebrew) [hereinafter The Shehadeh Report]. 
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or distorting contradictory information.139 The construction and eval-
uation of information in social settings is influenced by their prior 
beliefs, ideologies, and interests,140 as well as their group identities 
and commitments.141 Those tasked with preventing catastrophic ter-
ror attacks would, therefore, interpret associated risk differently 
than those tasked with preserving personal liberties. Paul Slovic and 
his coauthors found that subjective judgments are a major component 
of any risk assessment, regardless of whether these assessments are 
made by experts or lay people.142 They specifically point out the prob-
lem of overconfidence, finding that experts think they can estimate 
failure rates with much greater precision than is actually the case.143  
 Some common ways in which experts misjudge factual information 
and associated risks include the following: (1) failure to consider the 
ways in which human errors can influence technological systems; (2) 
failure to anticipate human response to safety measures; and (3) in-
sensitivity to how technological systems function as a whole.144 While 
analyzing the intelligence failure with regard to the Iraqi weapons of 
mass destruction, Robert Jervis found that many of the intelligence 
community’s judgments were stated with overconfidence; while the 
preponderance of evidence indicated that Iraq had weapons of mass 
destruction, it was not sufficient to prove it beyond a reasonable 
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doubt.145 Assumptions were examined insufficiently, and assessments 
were based on previous judgments without carrying forward the un-
certainties.146   
  Legal evaluations of risks associated with targeted killings (such 
as collateral damage assessments) are prone to expert bias on two 
levels: first, by intelligence agents, as they collect and analyze infor-
mation; and second, by lawyers, as they evaluate the intelligence in-
formation presented to them.  
 Overconfidence becomes an even greater problem in the counter-
terrorism context, due to people’s extreme aversion of the risks asso-
ciated with terrorism.147 As Jervis pointed out, states are prone to 
exaggerate the reasonableness of their own positions and the hostile 
intent of others.148 Similarly, Ephraim Kahana, while analyzing Is-
raeli intelligence failures, emphasized the inherent problem of overes-
timation of threats.149 The urgency of many targeted killing decisions, 
the danger associated with non-action, and the cohesiveness of the 
intelligence community, add to the risks of individual and institu-
tional biased interpretation of information.150  
 1.   Risk of Error Assessing Potential Risk to Civilians  
 President Obama declared that “before any strike is taken, there 
must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured -- the 
highest standard we can set.”151 Indeed, it is well accepted that “every 
effort must be made to minimize collateral damage.”152 But how is the 
anticipated collateral damage being assessed? McNeal describes, 
lengthily, a highly sophisticated and automated process, using soft-
ware (FAST-CD) that allows us to predict the anticipated effects of a 
weapon on certain targets. The weapons-effect data contained in 
FAST-CD are based on empirical data gathered from field tests, 
                                                                                                                       
 145. Robert Jervis, Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq, 29 J. 
STRATEGIC STUD. 3, 14 (2006). 
 146. Id. at 22. 
 147. Leonie Huddy et al., Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies, 49 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 593 (2005). 
 148. Robert Jervis, War and Misperception, 18 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 675, 688 (1988). 
 149. Kahana lists many Israeli intelligence failures that occurred during the years and 
calls the academic community to focus their attention and resources on the inherent prob-
lem of overestimation of threats. Ephraim Kahana, Analyzing Israel’s Intelligence Failures, 
18 INT’L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 262, 274 (2005). 
 150. Dina Badie, Groupthink, Iraq, and the War on Terror: Explaining US Policy Shift 
Toward Iraq, 6 FOREIGN POL’Y ANALYSIS 277 (2010). For a different explanation, see 
McNeal, supra note 7, at 755-758. 
 151. Obama, Speech at National Defense University, supra note 55. 
 152. Amos N. Guiora, Determining a Legitimate Target: The Dilemma of the Decision-
Maker, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 315, 331 (2011). 
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probability, historical observations from weapons employed on the 
battlefield, and physics-based computerized models for collateral 
damage estimates.153 Casualty estimates are also predicted based on 
standardized methods, including the Population Density Reference 
Table, which lists data from the intelligence community and allows 
for estimates of the population density during day, night, and special 
events.154  
 While these methods help to standardize the targeted killing deci-
sionmaking process and to minimize certain types of human error, 
they are nonetheless imperfect and are even prone to different kinds 
of errors. First, the data is limited by the quantity and reliability of 
the intelligence information collected.155 Naturally, security agencies 
spend time, efforts, and resources on collecting intelligence on their 
targets and their whereabouts. However, with regard to collecting 
intelligence on the anticipated collateral damage, it seems that most 
of the effort focuses on algorithm-based assessments, which are in-
herently limited as they cannot take into account changes in the op-
erational environment or the reliability of intelligence data.156 The 
accuracy and reliability of such information are further challenged by 
the fact that suspected terrorists tend to change their location fre-
quently, making it harder to collect reliable intelligence on the antic-
ipated collateral damage in real time.  
 Second, this highly sophisticated collateral damage calculation 
creates the illusion of robustness, while masking the big picture and 
discouraging decisionmakers from exercising their common sense. 
Since so many individuals are involved in collecting and feeding data 
into these sophisticated, technology-based calculations, the outlook 
on the events changes dramatically, and flesh and blood people are 
reduced to meaningless numbers.157  
 2.   Risk of Error Assessing Means to Prevent Harming Civilians  
 Similar to collateral damage calculations, the existence of “feasi-
ble” precautions depends on the availability of intelligence infor-
mation about the target and its surroundings.158 Determining wheth-
er the targeting state did everything possible to ensure a correct 
identification of the target, to choose appropriate means, and to care-
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fully assess the anticipated collateral damage, necessitates a careful 
examination of the intelligence information concerning risk assess-
ments. There are several challenges concerning precaution assess-
ments in the targeted killing decisionmaking process. First, limited 
intelligence: the existence of alternatives to targeted killings or to the 
specific course of action in a given case is dependent upon the availa-
bility of information. As intelligence information is inherently lim-
ited, assessments of the alternatives are also limited. Second, biased 
risk assessments: when alternatives are considered, risks to one’s 
soldiers or civilians dominate the decisionmaking process and influ-
ence the risk assessment process. Third, the treatment of uncertain-
ty: intelligence is always uncertain. Information is limited in scope, is 
open to competing interpretations, and there are gaps to be filled by 
one’s subjective interpretation. In the context of counterterrorism, 
risk aversion may fill these gaps with false assumptions, and over-
confidence may contribute to misjudgments of actual risks. Fourth, 
secretive processes and limited oversight: it is impossible to assess 
whether precaution measures were sufficiently taken without access 
to the information on the decisionmaking process, the relevant intel-
ligence, and the existing alternatives, which are typically secret.  
 3.   Intelligence, Institutions, and Inescapable Errors 
 In her book Spying Blind, Amy Zegart points out that while at-
tributing failure to individuals is understandable, it is also danger-
ous, as it misses the institutional constraints and forces that make it 
likely that talented people will make poor decisions.159 She finds that 
institutional weaknesses in both the CIA and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation were at the heart of the intelligence failure concerning 
the 9/11 attack. But can these weaknesses be resolved using appro-
priate institutional reform? 
 Analyzing the intelligence failure concerning Iraqi’s weapons of 
mass destruction and the reports that investigated this failure, Rob-
ert Jervis concluded that intelligence errors are inescapable.160 Focus-
ing on inherent biases and social structures in the intelligence com-
munity, he argued that while these reports convey a great deal of 
useful information, they are not satisfactory either intellectually or 
for improving intelligence:  
I think we can be certain that the future will see serious intelli-
gence failures, some of which will be followed by reports like these. 
Reforms can only reduce and not eliminate intelligence errors, and 
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in any event there is no reason to expect that the appropriate re-
forms will be put in place. Perhaps a later scholar will write a re-
view like this one as well.161  
B.   Inherent Risks for Civilians  
 The “bureaucracy of killing” described above entails many risks to 
innocent civilians, which are intensified by the very nature of terror-
ism. Being “the weapon of the weak,”162 terrorism challenges the 
principle of distinction, and thus puts civilians at risk, in four dis-
tinct ways. First, by definition, terrorists target civilians and direct 
their attacks at random individuals. This deliberate victimization of 
innocent civilians creates a public outcry for revenge and promotes 
political receptiveness to measures that may put enemy civilians at 
risk.163  
 Second, terrorist organizations act in clandestine ways and find 
shelter in loosely governed civilian areas.164 To escape accountability, 
they do not wear uniforms and make efforts to blend in with the civil-
ian population. Therefore, any counterterrorism measure faces diffi-
culties in avoiding collateral damage and protecting innocent by-
standers.165  
 Third, as terrorists hide among civilians, the risk of failed or mis-
taken identification increases. In fact, McNeal found, according to 
interviews he conducted with military officials, that seventy percent 
of unintended civilian casualties in targeted killing operations in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq were attributable to mistaken identification.166 
This means that terrorism tactics, together with the limitations of 
intelligence information, increases the risk to innocent civilians from 
targeted killing operations.  
 Fourth, identifying an individual as a terrorist in and of itself is a 
challenging task. While legal categorizations demand a clear “yes” or 
“no” answer, in reality, terrorism is rather a spectrum of activities 
and engagement, and individuals’ involvement can change with time 
and move from one point to another on this spectrum.167 The overly 
sophisticated bureaucracy of creating kill-list is designed to accom-
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modate a simple binary categorization and fails to recognize this type 
of variation.  
C.   Uncertain Outcomes: (In)effectiveness of Targeted Killings  
as a Counterterrorism Measure  
 Lastly, targeted killings have been used as a military method 
based on assumptions of efficacy. Mainly, it is believed to disrupt the 
operations of terror organizations and to decrease the number of suc-
cessful deadly attacks. However, for over a decade scholars have 
failed to provide conclusive empirical data that demonstrates the ef-
fectiveness of targeted killing operations. While some scholars find 
targeted killing (or decapitation) to have some positive outcomes—
such as reducing violence, increasing terror organization’s mortality, 
or contributing to tactical advantages—others have found the com-
plete opposite.  
 For example, based on a database of 207 terrorist groups from 
1970 to 2008, Bryan Price found that leadership decapitation (by kill-
ing or capturing the organization’s leader) increases the mortality 
rate of terrorist groups, at least with regard to young organiza-
tions.168 Somewhat similarly, Patrick Johnston found positive out-
comes of decapitation with regard to various metrics of counter-
militancy effectiveness.169 Likewise, Audrey Kurth Cronin concluded 
that leadership decapitation has often hastened the decline or col-
lapse of a terrorist organization.170 
 However, other studies reached very different conclusions. For 
example, Jenna Jordan found that decapitation is not an effective 
counterterrorism strategy and might even have counterproductive 
effects—especially in larger, older, religious, and separatist organiza-
tions.171 Similarly, Mohammed Hafez and Joseph Hatfield found that 
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targeted killings have no significant impact, in either the short or 
long term, on rates of terror attacks.172 Another study concluded that 
the U.S. drone strike policy leads to death and injury of civilians, 
causes considerable harm to the daily lives of civilians, and under-
mines respect for the rule of law and international law.173 In his re-
cent book, Objective Troy, Scott Shane documented evidence on the 
blowback from drone strikes,174 and concluded that targeted killings 
fuel the central narrative of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (accord-
ing to this narrative, the United States is at war with Islam, continu-
ously killing Muslims, and therefore the obligatory religious response 
is armed jihad).175 
 While this breadth of information is inconclusive, it does suggest 
that under some circumstances targeted killing operations have some 
counterproductive outcomes.176 What is certain is the uncertainty 
about the effects of targeted killing operations.  
 The following Part will demonstrate these inherent uncertainties 
in targeted killing law, decisionmaking processes, and outcomes, as 
well as illustrate the core role uncertainty plays in diminishing the 
legal constraints.  
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V.   THE ISRAELI COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE TARGETED  
KILLING OF SALAH SHEHADEH  
 Salah Shehadeh was the head of the Operational Branch of Ha-
mas in Gaza and was accused by Israel of having killed a large num-
ber of Israeli military personnel and civilians. On July 22, 2002, the 
Israeli Air Force dropped a one-ton bomb on Shehadeh’s house in Ga-
za City. This bomb killed Shehadeh himself, his assistant (Zaher 
Saleh Nassar), his wife (Laila Khamis Shehadeh), and Shehadeh’s 
fifteen-year-old daughter (Iman Salah Shehadeh). Eleven other civil-
ians were also killed in the attack, including twenty-seven-year-old 
Iman Hassan Matar, together with her five children—Alaa Muham-
mad Matar (eleven years old), Dunia Rami Matar (five years old), 
Muhammad Raed Matar (four years old), Aiman Raed Matar (two 
years old), and Dina Raed Matar (less than a year old)—who were all 
killed in one of the nearby tin shacks. Twenty-two-year-old Muna 
Fahmi al-Huti, and her two children—Subhi Mahmoud al-Huti (five 
years old) and Muhammad Mahmoud al-Huti (three years old)—were 
also killed in the nearby “garage house.” Finally, forty-two-year-old 
Yusef Subhi ‘Ali a-Shawa was also killed in one of the tin shacks, and 
sixty-seven-year-old Khader Muhammad a-Sa’idi, who was walking 
in the street, was fatally wounded (he later died of his wounds). Addi-
tionally, 150 civilian bystanders were injured.177 
A.   The Establishment of the Shehadeh Commission 
 Due to the severe outcomes of this operation and the extensive 
collateral damage, the IDF conducted internal investigations of the 
incident. Eventually, the IDF Military Advocate General (MAG) de-
cided not to initiate any criminal investigations concerning this inci-
dent. In response, several human rights organizations and individu-
als submitted a petition to the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the 
HCJ, demanding to reverse the MAG’s decision and to open a crimi-
nal investigation. During the court hearings, the state accepted the 
court’s suggestion to establish an independent and objective investi-
gatory commission to investigate the circumstances of the operation 
and the severe collateral damage inflicted on innocent civilians.  
 On January 23, 2008, then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert appoint-
ed the Shehadeh Commission to examine the targeted killing opera-
tion directed against Shehadeh. The Shehadeh Commission was in-
structed to review the circumstances of the attack and the availabil-
ity of an effective alternative. It was also authorized to recommend 
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administrative measures, disciplinary measures, or the initiating of 
criminal proceedings against the relevant actors.  
 The Shehadeh Commission was composed of three members. The 
Prime Minister appointed Zvi Inbar—the former MAG and the Legal 
Advisor of the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament)—as the head of the 
Commission. The other two members of the Commission were retired 
Major General Yitzhak Eitan (former Commander of the IDF Central 
Command) and Mr. Yitzhak Dar (former head of the Operations De-
partment at the Israel Security Agency (ISA)). 
 Soon after the announcement of the appointment of the Shehadeh 
Commission members, the petitioners submitted new arguments op-
posing the decision to appoint only members with military and secu-
rity experience. On August 23, 2008, the HCJ finally rejected the pe-
tition, holding that there was no defect in the appointment and for-
mation of the Commission.178 The court emphasized that none of the 
Commission members were at the time serving in any of the state’s 
security or military agencies. The court further stated that the skep-
ticism regarding the objectivity of the Shehadeh Commission was 
completely unfounded, especially “at this early stage, when the 
Commission has not yet completed its workings and no conclusions 
have been made.”179 On August 31, 2009, the Commission’s chairper-
son, Zvi Inbar, passed away and was replaced by retired Israeli Su-
preme Court Justice Tova Strasberg-Cohen.  
B.   The Shehadeh Report 
 On February 27, 2011, the Shehadeh Commission published its 
final report (the Shehadeh Report).180 It begins with an analysis of 
the security situation that existed between the beginning of the Sec-
ond Intifada (September 2000), and the targeted killing of Shehadeh 
on July 22, 2002.181 The Commission characterized this period as an 
“armed conflict” and noted that during these two years many Pales-
tinian terror attacks took place within Israel. These attacks caused 
the death of 474 Israelis and injured 2,649.182  
 The Shehadeh Report then describes the role that each govern-
mental authority plays in a targeted killing operation. The ISA, the 
authority that initiates targeted killing operations, is responsible for 
gathering the relevant intelligence and for mapping the surroundings 
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of the target area in order to facilitate evaluation of anticipated col-
lateral damage (i.e., uninvolved civilians and civilian objects that 
might be damaged from the attack).183 The IDF is the authority that 
usually executes the attack. The IDF’s Operations Department is re-
sponsible for ensuring that the intended target is a legitimate target 
and for exploring the feasibility of detaining the targeted individual 
or using a less lethal measure that would attain the same goal of 
preventing the intended target from continuing their terror activity. 
After receiving all the necessary authorizations to implement the op-
eration, the method of attack is chosen in a way that will ensure the 
operation’s success while minimizing the anticipated collateral dam-
age (which must remain non-excessive).184 Apart from authorization 
from the head of the ISA and the IDF’s Chief of General Staff, the 
operation must also be approved by two senior politicians: the Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Defense.185 
 With regard to the normative framework, the Shehadeh Commis-
sion stipulated that IHL is the relevant legal framework, and that it 
allows attacking military targets or combatants and civilians taking 
a direct part in hostilities, provided that the attack also meets the 
requirements of distinction and proportionality.186 The opinion re-
ferred to several additional principles that should be considered 
when ordering a targeted killing operation: the exceptionality of the 
measure; the use of this measure only against persons who are either 
committing terror attacks or ordering the commission of such at-
tacks; basing the operation on solid, accurate, and reliable intelli-
gence that indicates that the designated target takes direct part in 
terror attacks and will probably continue to take part in such actions 
unless neutralized; using this measure as a preventive measure only, 
rather than as a punitive measure; using this measure only where 
there is no less lethal alternative; minimizing the damage to unin-
volved civilians and applying the principle of proportionality; and us-
ing this measure only in areas in which the IDF does not have actual 
control.187 The Shehadeh Report further stressed four requirements 
stemming from the Israeli Supreme Court’s landmark case concern-
ing the legality of targeted killings: (1) accurate and reliable infor-
mation should be gathered about the identity and classification of the 
civilians who take direct part in the hostilities; (2) all feasible efforts 
to use less lethal measures should be made; (3) the principle of pro-
                                                                                                                       
 183. Id. at 25. 
 184. Id. at 26.  
 185. Id. at 27. 
 186. Id. at 34-37. 
 187. Id. at 31. 
2017]  RETHINKING TARGETED KILLING  
 
981 
portionality must be observed and the harm to uninvolved civilians 
must not be excessive; and (4) an investigatory committee should be 
established in order to investigate operations that resulted in excep-
tional outcomes.188 
 Applying the normative legal framework to the specific circum-
stances of this operation, the Shehadeh Commission determined that 
Shehadeh was indeed a legitimate target, as a civilian who directly 
participated in the hostilities.189 The Commission also found that 
there were no lesser means—such as detaining him—available since 
Shehadeh took shelter in a very densely populated refugee camp in 
Gaza and any operation to detain him would have endangered the 
lives of IDF soldiers.190  
 The Shehadeh Report then elaborates on the internal processes 
and the role that each military or security authority played in pre-
paring the targeted killing of Shehadeh. The ISA was in charge of 
surveillance of Shehadeh and was responsible for planning the opera-
tion.191 All the information was brought to Yuval Diskin, the Deputy 
Head of the ISA, the ISA authority responsible for targeted killings. 
Diskin’s recommendation to approve Shehadeh as a legitimate target 
was submitted to Avi Dichter, the Head of the ISA, and was then 
presented to Moshe Yaalon, then-Chief of General Staff. Thereafter, 
Diskin, consulted with the IDF authority responsible for targeted 
killings, the Deputy Chief of General Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi, and with 
the highest political echelons. Finally, Diskin consulted with then-
Minister of Defense Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, and then-Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon.192 After receiving all of the relevant authorizations, the 
ISA began tracking Shehadeh’s location.193 Knowing he was wanted 
by the Israeli authorities, Shehadeh used seven hideouts and kept 
moving between them.194 Throughout this time, several alternative 
plans to target Shehadeh were abandoned, due to a low-success as-
sessment and a high risk to IDF soldiers and civilians in the area 
(twice due to positive information concerning the presence of 
Shehadeh’s daughter).195 According to the Shehadeh Report, Israel 
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security services cancel operations when there is positive information 
about the presence of children who might be affected by the attack.196 
 A few days before the operation, Shehadeh was located in an 
apartment in a two-story building in a densely populated refugee 
camp in northern Gaza. According to the information available at the 
time, the first floor was used as a warehouse, and the second floor 
was used as a residence.197 The method of attack chosen was the 
dropping of a one-ton bomb from the air. According to the Shehadeh 
Report, this method of attack was chosen for two reasons: high prob-
ability of success and low risk to IDF forces. The Shehadeh Commis-
sion also noted that the alternative of using two half-ton bombs was 
considered but was rejected because the probability of success was 
too low, and because there was a higher risk that one of the bombs 
would miss the target and kill many uninvolved civilians. 198 
 Ultimately, the Shehadeh Commission concluded that the decision 
to approve the implementation of the operation, the risk of harming 
Shehadeh’s daughter notwithstanding, was a legitimate decision.199  
With regard to Shehadeh’s assistant, Zahar Natzer, the Commission 
found him to be a legitimate target on his own, and the anticipated 
death of Shehadeh’s wife was considered proportionate collateral 
damage.200 The Commission nonetheless concluded that the death of 
Shehadeh’s daughter, as well as the other eleven civilian fatalities, 
was disproportional and excessive—even though Shehadeh himself 
was a high-risk target.201 However, the Commission accepted the Is-
raeli authorities’ claims that this disproportionate outcome was not 
anticipated, and that had such an outcome been anticipated, the op-
eration would not have been carried out.202 The Commission exam-
ined the information gathering process that led to the belief that the 
collateral damage would be less extensive than it was and concluded 
that the intelligence that was presented to the decisionmakers was 
incomplete.203 It also found that at one point in the process, the ab-
sence of information as to the presence of people in the vicinity of the 
house was presented as information to the effect that there were no 
people in that area.204 The Commission determined that the failure of 
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intelligence with respect to the presence of uninvolved civilians in 
close proximity to Shehadeh stemmed from two main factors: (1) the 
resources that were devoted to discovering his whereabouts (and not 
the surroundings of this area); and (2) the concern that if Israeli in-
telligence agencies were to attempt to retrieve information regarding 
others in the area, Shehadeh would understand that his hideout was 
not secure.205 Therefore, it concluded that the balance between mili-
tary necessity and protection of uninvolved civilians was inappropri-
ate, and this led to a disproportionate (yet unanticipated) outcome.206 
 Based on its analysis, the Shehadeh Commission found no reason 
to suspect that a crime (or any violation of relevant IHL or Israeli 
law) was committed by any of the persons involved in the planning, 
authorization, and implementation of the targeted killing opera-
tion.207 The Commission emphasized that the mere fact that civilians 
were inadvertently killed does not render the operation unlawful or a 
war crime, and that the reasonableness and legality of the operation 
should be considered on the basis of the available ex-ante infor-
mation, even if it turned out that the information was false.208 The 
Commission was therefore satisfied with the fact that all of the rele-
vant state bodies conducted internal inquiries and that the process 
was subsequently improved in order to avoid outcomes of this nature 
in the future.209  
 In its recommendations, the Shehadeh Commission suggested 
that the rules of IHL be better embedded within the work of the se-
curity services, that the principle of proportionality be observed, and 
that written guidelines on the use of targeted killing in accordance 
with IHL be formulated by the IDF.210 Moreover, it expressed the 
opinion that the ISA should strengthen its intelligence efforts with 
regard to collateral damage to the uninvolved civilian population.211 
The Commission also recommended that all relevant interactions, 
communications, and decisions preceding a targeted killing operation 
be documented and that the relevant documentation be preserved for 
future investigation, if needed.212 While this Article raises meaningful 
reservations concerning the work and conclusions of the Commission, 
it acknowledges its important contribution to advancing transparen-
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cy of targeted killing operations. The Commission’s general recom-
mendations to the security authorities are of significant value, as 
they highlight some procedural aspects that can—and should—be 
improved.    
C.   Uncertainty, Intelligence, and Risk of Error 
 1.   Deference to the Security Agencies  
 The Shehadeh Commission’s report was based on the information 
that was submitted to it by the IDF, the ISA, and the U.S. Air 
Force.213 The information provided by these bodies—in spite of being 
interested parties in this investigation—was accepted by the Com-
mission in its entirety. The Commission did not find any of their tes-
timony unconvincing—even when parts of the testimony were inher-
ently inconsistent. The Commission did not critically challenge any of 
the positions presented by the security agencies. In some instances, 
the complete and overwhelming acceptance of the security agencies’ 
position stands in stark contradiction to plain logic or to other pieces 
of evidence. For example, while elaborating on Shehadeh’s terrorist 
activity—a description that could be a “cut and paste” from the in-
formation provided by the relevant security agencies—the Commis-
sion accepts as fact the assertion that Shehadeh was personally re-
sponsible for all of the Israeli terror casualties who were killed or in-
jured from July 2001 till Shehadeh’s death in July 2002.214 Incidents 
are not specified, details are not presented, and no other external 
sources are mentioned; nor is there any reference to the fragmenta-
tion in Hamas leadership or to other terror organizations that were 
operating in Gaza at the time.215 Another example can be found in the 
Commission’s acceptance of the IDF’s claim that the method of drop-
ping a one-ton bomb on Shehadeh’s house was chosen, among other 
reasons, to reduce collateral damage (while mentioning the alterna-
tive that was considered—and rejected—to use two half-ton bombs 
instead).216 To support this finding, the Commission added that the 
one-ton bomb was accurate in hitting Shehadeh’s house, and that the 
damage to the surroundings was caused not by the impact of the 
bomb itself, but rather by its shock wave (as if that was not a natural 
anticipated outcome of the hit).217 The Commission also accepted as 
an uncontested fact the claim that the operation was conducted at 
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night in order to minimize risk to civilians. This claim stood in stark 
contradiction to other pieces of information, suggesting that people 
were actually living in the tin shacks and, thus, would most probably 
be sleeping in their beds at such time (the evidence also suggested that 
the tin shacks would sustain the most severe collateral damage).218 
 2.   “Failure is an Orphan” 
 While acknowledging that the disproportionate outcome resulted 
from severe intelligence failures (including misrepresentation of ex-
isting information), the Shehadeh Commission concluded that the 
targeted killing of Shehadeh was completely lawful. It determined 
that the operation was a legitimate attack against a person who par-
ticipated directly in the hostilities, and that the “unfortunate harm” 
caused by the attack was unintentional and unpredictable, and was 
not the result of disrespect for human life.219 The Commission there-
fore determined that none of the involved security and political deci-
sionmakers violated either Israeli or international criminal law and 
exonerated all of those involved in the attack from any criminal, ad-
ministrative, or even ethical responsibility. The “mistakes” made 
were attributed to an isolated intelligence failure caused by “incorrect 
assessments and mistaken judgments.”220 The Commission refrained 
from attributing these “failures,” “incorrect assessments,” and “mis-
takes” to any of the relevant decisionmakers, and no one was held 
responsible for any of it.221  
 While it certainly could be the case that no specific individual was 
criminally responsible for committing international or domestic 
crimes, it is nonetheless possible that international law (in this case, 
the principle of proportionality or the principle of precaution) was 
violated. Unfortunately, the Commission did not separate between 
the relevant facts, the deviation from the applicable legal norms, and 
the possible legal implications of such a deviation.  
 3.   The Requirement of “Positive Information”  
 In dealing with the death of Shehadeh’s fifteen-year-old daughter 
in the attack, the Shehadeh Commission adopted the state’s position 
that her death was not anticipated by any of the relevant deci-
sionmakers.222 In adopting this view, the Commission completely ig-
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nored the testimony of the Deputy Head of ISA, who objected to car-
rying out the operation as planned, based on his concrete concerns 
that Shehadeh’s daughter was with him. In dismissing this infor-
mation, the Commission stated that without positive information 
that the child was actually present in the house, it was legitimate to 
assume she was not there and to carry on with the operation.223 The 
combination of this determination (the need for positive information 
as to the presence of civilians), together with the acceptance of the 
intelligence decision not to focus its efforts on investigating the sur-
roundings of the target, lead to an unacceptable outcome. It empties 
the principle of precaution from any substance and encourages states 
to shoot with their eyes closed. Without positive intelligence infor-
mation determining that innocent civilians are present—anything is 
permissible. This “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy creates a fictional reali-
ty, shaped by the information that intelligence and security agencies 
choose to collect. Naturally, these agencies prefer to focus their ef-
forts on security threats rather than on humanitarian interests. The 
result is that a fifteen-year-old girl, as well as seven other children, 
were killed simply because no one chose to collect and provide posi-
tive information confirming their presence.  
 4.   Structured Decisionmaking Processes and Common Sense 
 The Shehadeh Commission concluded that there was “no positive 
information” affirming the presence of civilian residents in the tin 
shacks located next to Shehadeh’s house. The Commission did 
acknowledge the already common knowledge that this area is densely 
populated, and the several air force photos clearly showing water 
tanks, and TV satellite dishes on the roofs of these tin shacks.224 It 
also mentioned the air force estimations concerning severe collateral 
damage to the tin shacks and their inhabitants.225 Nonetheless, it did 
not view this information as sufficiently “positive” evidence to arrive 
at a conclusion that people were actually living in the shacks and 
that precautions should be taken to protect their lives.226 The Com-
mission decided to treat this information as “speculative” and “un-
clear.”  
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 5.   The Treatment of Internal Disagreements  
 The decision to carry out the operation, despite the evidence that 
suggested that innocent civilians might be hurt, was not a unani-
mous decision. On July 19, 2002, the Deputy Director of the ISA held 
a meeting of both ISA and Air Force personnel concerning the 
planned operation. In the meeting, the intelligence information was 
presented and various scenarios were discussed.227 In the discussion, 
the Air Force representatives estimated that the surroundings would 
suffer severe damage, and that the greatest damage—even if the at-
tack hits the target precisely as planned—would be caused to the tin 
shacks and to a nearby garage house.228 While the garage house was 
believed to be empty at night, the assessment indicated there would 
be at least several wounded and dead in the tin shacks.229 At this 
point, two senior ISA members advocated two opposing options. The 
Head of the Operations Division suggested a different course of ac-
tion to minimize collateral damage and to prevent the anticipated 
harm to uninvolved civilians. However, the Head of the Southern Re-
gion insisted that the operation should proceed as planned and stated 
that attacking at night would minimize the harm to uninvolved civil-
ians. At the end of that meeting, the Deputy Head of the ISA decided 
not to proceed with the operation as planned, and to continue gather-
ing intelligence in order to come up with an alternative ground oper-
ation that would better protect innocent civilians.230 Immediately af-
terwards, the Head of the Southern Region appealed this decision to 
the Director of the ISA. The Director of the ISA upheld the appeal 
and reversed the decision—determining that the operation would be 
carried out as planned. His decision was based on several considera-
tions, all focused on state security: (1) the scope, frequency, and se-
verity of terror attacks against Israel had increased; and (2) the 
probability of finding a practical alternative was low and the discus-
sions that would have to be conducted with regard to the potential 
new plan might thwart the killing of the target altogether.231 Later 
that day, the IDF Head of Operations Branch held a meeting where 
the ISA representatives presented the planned operation. At the end 
of this meeting, the IDF Head of Operations Branch recommended 
postponing the operation until the tin shacks were evacuated. Then, 
the final meeting was held at the IDF Chief of Staff’s office. The dis-
cussion focused on the potential harm to residents of the tin shacks. 
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The Deputy Chief of Staff, as well as the Head of the IDF Operations 
Branch, objected to the proposed plan and recommended waiting and, 
in the meantime, gathering more information. The Head of the ISA 
recommended carrying on with the operation as planned. At the end 
of this meeting, the IDF Chief of Staff decided to approve the opera-
tion as planned. His decision was based on the assumption that the 
garage house would be empty and that the risk of killing a few civil-
ian bystanders is proportional to the enormous damage anticipated 
from the continuing terrorist attacks planned by Shehadeh.232 Be-
tween July 19th (when the final decision to carry out the operation 
was made) and July 22nd (when the attack took place), the operation 
was postponed several times due to conclusive evidence concerning 
the presence of Shehadeh’s daughter and other children in the vicini-
ty.233 These internal deliberations demonstrate the different ap-
proaches to precaution. One approach would be to err on the side of 
caution and to treat uncertainty as evidence that civilians will be 
harmed, unless conclusively proven otherwise. This approach moti-
vates the state to conduct the necessary investigations to clarify the 
situation and to positively find out the possible implications of an at-
tack. This was the approach adopted by the Deputy Head of the ISA 
and by the IDF Head of Operations Branch. A different approach 
would be to ignore uncertainty and to consider only “positive infor-
mation” that the relevant agencies came across in deciding the ap-
propriate course of action. This approach reduces the state’s burden 
to investigate to a minimum level, and contradicts the very concept of 
precaution. Nonetheless, this was the approach adopted by the Head 
of the ISA and the IDF Chief of Staff, as well as, later on, by the 
Shehadeh Commission. By adopting such a narrow approach to pre-
caution, the Commission paved the way for decisionmakers to ignore 
inconclusive information that does not coincide with their agenda, 
without the need to investigate further and obtain more information. 
And more than that: according to the testimony before the Commis-
sion, the security agencies and decisionmakers in this case had, in 
fact, positive information affirming the presence of civilians in the 
vicinity of the targeted area. Nonetheless, they chose to ignore this 
information, probably due to their strong motivation to carry out the 
targeted killing operation.  
 6.   Political Oversight 
 Lastly, political oversight of the military and security agencies is 
crucial for maintaining and upholding the principle of precaution. 
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While security agencies are focused on narrow security considera-
tions, the political leadership considers a wider range of considera-
tions, including foreign affairs and diplomatic interests, economic 
interests, and humanitarian interests. The Shehadeh Report re-
vealed a troubling deference to the security experts on the part of the 
political leaders. The responsible minister—the Minister of De-
fense—testified that he largely left the decision to his military secre-
tary and that he trusted the ISA and military experts. In fact, the 
Minister of Defense was abroad, and did not personally participate in 
any of the relevant meetings.234 He was briefed by his military secre-
tary by phone and approved the operation. The brief did not include 
information on the existence of alternatives, the danger to residents 
of the tin shacks, and the disagreements between senior officials of 
the ISA and the IDF.235 The Prime Minister could not testify due to 
his medical condition.236  
 7.   Wartime Fact-finding and National Narratives 
 The Shehadeh Report exemplifies how national investigatory 
commissions may be held captive by their members’ national identi-
ties and narratives. The members of the Shehadeh Commission 
demonstrated complete trust in the witnesses it interviewed from the 
ISA and the IDF, avoided challenging inconsistent information, and 
expressed their confidence in the Israeli authorities. In their prelimi-
nary note, the Commission members thank the political and military 
personnel for their interviews and for providing the Commission with 
all of the relevant materials.237 In the Shehadeh Report itself, the 
Commission states that “all senior IDF and ISA commanders and the 
political leadership fully cooperated with the commission, willingly 
and in a complete and unequivocal manner.” The Commission further 
devotes a full paragraph for describing the efforts of the political and 
military authorities. These compliments included “finding every rele-
vant document,” “testifying fully, openly, and without evasion,” and 
“answering challenging questions without any reservations.”238 In 
several sections of the Shehadeh Report, the Commission praises the 
IDF and ISA commanders for their awareness of the relevant laws, 
and their sensitivity to the potential risks to uninvolved civilians.239 
The narrative adopted and reproduced by the Shehadeh Report is 
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fully consistent with the national Israeli narrative, and the Israeli 
ethos that “the IDF is the most moral army in the world.”240 The 
Shehadeh Report uses positive words to describe the ISA and IDF 
actions, such as “sensitivity,” “awareness,” “preventive,” and refrains 
from criticizing any of the relevant decisionmakers. When dealing 
with the death of Shehadeh’s daughter, fifteen-year-old Iman 
Shehadeh, the Shehadeh Report states that she “found her death” at 
the residence (rather than “was killed by”), emphasizing that her 
death was “unintended,” “unwanted,” and “unexpected” (even though 
the Deputy-Head of the ISA decided to cancel the operation as he 
suspected she would be killed by the bomb).241 In stark contradiction, 
when describing Palestinian actions, the Shehadeh Report uses com-
pletely different language, emphasizing the “murderous” nature of 
Palestinian terrorism (even when dealing with operations directed 
against IDF soldiers rather than against civilians or more accurately, 
without distinguishing between different types of actions).242 Accord-
ing the Commission’s narrative, Palestinian actions are “murderous 
terrorism,” while IDF actions are sensitive and thoughtful; Israeli 
casualties are “victims,” killed in bloodshed violence, while Palestini-
an casualties are “unanticipated collateral damage,” who “found their 
death” in a “tragic” occurrence. These examples demonstrate the in-
herent limitations of state-sponsored investigatory mechanisms, 
which may frustrate domestic attempts at effective oversight of tar-
geted killing operations.  
VI.   REDUCING UNCERTAINTY: A NEW MODEL FOR INTERPRETING AND 
IMPLEMENTING TARGETED KILLING LAW  
 International law governing targeted killings is skewed with un-
certainty. In fact, uncertainty surrounds every aspect of targeted kill-
ing law: the relevant body of law to be applied, the interpretation of 
the relevant norms, and the implementation of these norms, includ-
ing identification of “targetable” individuals and determinations con-
cerning the anticipated collateral damage and feasible precautions. 
Targeted decisions are based, primarily, on uncertain intelligence; 
this uncertain, limited information is interpreted by security-oriented 
decisionmakers, guided by obscure legal definitions. The previous 
Parts of this Article demonstrated how the relevant international law 
and internal processes adopted to implement it intensify the inherent 
uncertainties in current targeting schemes. This Part proposes sev-
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eral recommendations to reduce this uncertainty. As uncertainty is 
inherent to targeting decisions, reducing uncertainty necessitates 
restricting targeting decisions and construing a clear and unambigu-
ous interpretation of core concepts.   
A.   Military Necessity as a Limiting Test 
 Targeted killings are lawful only when killing the targeted in-
dividual is necessary to prevent them from committing a concrete 
violent act that is underway. It will only be considered necessary to 
kill a suspected terrorist if the threat they pose is concrete and im-
minent. The emphasis should be on the preventive purpose of target-
ed killings: such operations should never be used as a punishment for 
past actions, but only as a narrowly construed preventative measure. 
B.   Activity-Based Test to DPH 
 To improve clarity and provide a less subjective test for determi-
nations of DPH, an activity-based test (acts of war which by their na-
ture or purpose are likely to cause actual harm) should be adopted. 
Such a test would include three cumulative criteria: (1) threshold of 
harm, (2) direct causation, and (3) belligerent nexus. DPH should be 
understood as a temporary, activity-based loss of protection, which 
starts with the planning and preparatory measures for a concrete 
attack that satisfies the three previous criteria and lasts until the 
return from the location of its execution. The criteria for direct par-
ticipation should be clear, transparent, and leave no room for “grey 
areas” or interpretation. Most importantly, it should be clear that 
when the categorization is unclear or doubtful, the civilian protec-
tions should remain in place. 
C.   Proportionality: Targeted Killings as a Last Resort 
 Targeted killing should only be used as a last resort when other 
means (such as capture and detention) are unavailable. As a gen-
eral rule, less harmful means, such as capture and detention, are al-
most always available in a territory under the (de facto) jurisdiction 
of the targeting state. When calculating the collateral damage, civil-
ian lives from both sides should be equally respected and protected.  
D.   Precaution as a State of Mind 
 To improve the outcomes of security decisionmaking in the context 
of deadly preventive measures, this Article recommends shifting the 
focus from automated algorithms and checklists to basic common 
sense, with a duty to err on the side of caution. Before executing a 
targeted killing operation, all relevant information (including poten-
tial collateral damage) should be thoroughly gathered and carefully 
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analyzed by the responsible individuals, and common sense should 
complement automated computerized systems. “Inconclusive” or 
doubtful information necessitates conducting further investigation 
and information gathering. 
E.   Transparent Internal Processes and Political Oversight 
 Each country that employs targeted killings should make public 
its policies concerning targeted killings: What are the criteria for tar-
geting individuals? What are the policies concerning collateral dam-
age? What is considered sufficient evidence to justify targeted kill-
ing? And what is the internal process for approval of a targeted killing 
operation? It should be clear that the final responsibility lies with 
the political leadership, who must exercise meaningful oversight over 
the security agencies. 
F.   Independent Ex-Post Review 
 A rigorous and independent committee, capable of challenging 
the security agencies and of conducting effective ex-post review, 
should be established. The committee should be permanent and in-
dependent, and should be empowered to review—ex post—the deci-
sion to target an individual, the processes that were undergone, and 
the design and execution of the actual operation. The committee 
should include members from various backgrounds—such as individ-
uals who have served in the public defender’s office or civil society 
organizations—and not only former military officials or security ex-
perts. The committee must be authorized to review not only the secu-
rity agencies’ decisions but also the policies and oversight of the politi-
cal leadership. While conducting an ex-post review of targeted killing 
operations, the independent committee should be empowered to rec-
ommend initiating criminal investigations in appropriate cases, to 
determine whether international or national law concerning targeted 
killing were violated, and to determine whether reparations should 
be paid by the state in appropriate cases. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 Governments around the world have been targeting and killing 
individuals to prevent them from committing terror attacks or other 
atrocities. They use this method secretly, sometimes without even 
taking responsibility for such operations and without making most of 
the relevant information public. What are the criteria for targeting 
individuals? What is the amount and strength of evidence required to 
make targeting decisions? What are the procedures adopted to identi-
fy mistakes and avoid misuse of this method? And how should uncer-
tainty concerning the law or the facts be treated? Addressing the in-
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creasing use of drones (including for targeted killing operations), 
President Obama stated: 
[T]his new technology raises profound questions about who is tar-
geted and why, about civilian casualties and the risk of creating 
new enemies, about the legality of such strikes under U.S. and in-
ternational law, about accountability and morality.243  
This Article offers new answers to some of these old and taunting 
questions. It clearly defines legal terms such as “military necessity” 
and “feasible precaution;” it develops a clear-cut activity-based test 
for determinations on DPH; it designs an independent ex-post review 
mechanism for targeting decisions; and, it calls for governmental 
transparency concerning kill-lists and targeting decisionmaking pro-
cesses. Most importantly, it identifies uncertainty, in law and in 
practice, as an important challenge to any targeted killing regime. 
Based on analysis of interdisciplinary studies and lessons from the 
experience of both the United States and Israel, it advocates a trans-
parent, straightforward, and unambiguous interpretation of targeted 
killing law—an interpretation that can reduce uncertainty and, if 
adopted, protect civilians from the ravages of both terrorism and 
counterterrorism. 
 Finally, beyond the practical and normative implications of this 
study, it sheds light on a more general and basic problem of uncer-
tainty in assessing the risk to “enemy” civilians and property. The 
Shehadeh Commission illustrates how domestic investigatory bodies 
might be held captive by their national narrative and interpret in-
formation accordingly. In stark contradiction to the many paragraphs 
and elaboration on the suffering of the Israeli population as a result 
of Palestinian terror attacks, the information regarding the concrete 
damage to Palestinian civilians and to their properties caused by the 
Israeli military attack was short and laconic, containing only two fig-
ures—the numbers of civilians killed and the number of those in-
jured. The description of the poor and densely populated refugee 
camp where the attack took place was limited to the potential securi-
ty threats it created for IDF soldiers. The damage to nearby houses 
and civilian properties was not mentioned at all, and the names of 
the innocent bystanders who were killed in the street or trapped un-
der the ruins of their homes were completely absent. To the 
Shehadeh Commission, they were nothing more than unanticipated 
“collateral damage.” 
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